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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner seeks review of an opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals filed by that
court on October 29, 2009. This Court has jurisdiction to review judgments, orders, and
decrees of the Court of Appeals through certiorari. UTAHICODE § 78A-3-102(3)(a); see
also UTAH R. APP. P. 45-51. This Court granted certioraril on January 20, 2010. A true
and accurate copy of this Court's Order granting certiorari \$ attached at "Appendix A."
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in Affirming the District Court's
refusal to formally bifurcate the reception of evidence at thb custody hearing relating to a
change in circumstances and best interest of the parties' child.
Standard of Review:

It is a fundamental tenet of certiorari review that the

Supreme Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, not that of the trial court.
Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, % 7, 984 P.2d 987. On certiorari review, the Supreme Court
reviews the Court of Appeals' conclusions of law for cprrectness and grants them no
deference. Id, at^j 10.
Utah Code §30-3-10.4 states that a custody order Should not be modified unless
there has been a material and substantial change in circum$tances. In an action to modify
a custody order issued on the merits, a trial court is required to make a finding of
materially changed circumstances before it can consider evidence as to the best interests
of the child. Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 54 (Utah, 1|982). Failure to bifurcate the
evidence of changed circumstances and best interest off the child is reversible error.
Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 946 (Utah App. 1988).
1

Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved for review by this Court when
it was timely presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. (On file with the Court and
dated November 30, 2009). In addition, this Court granted certiorari to review this very
issue in its January 20, 2010 Order. {See Appendix A, at fl).
Issue 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's
determination that a substantial and material change in circumstances justified a
modification of custody.
Standard of Review: As a general rule, the standard of review for a custody
determination is abuse of discretion. Wall v. Wall, 700 P.2d 1124, 1125 n.l (Utah 1985).
A trial court has abused its discretion if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). Reversal is appropriate
when the decision is so unreasonable it is arbitrary and capricious. Kunzler v. O 'Dell,
855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). A finding of fact will be judged clearly
erroneous if it is against the clear weight of evidence, or if the reviewing court is left with
"a definite and firm conviction that a mistake had been made," although there is ample
evidence to support the finding. Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 476 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991).
In the instant case, Petitioner does not contend that the findings of fact were
insufficient in consideration of the evidence presented at trial.1

Rather, Petitioner

contends that the findings of fact are themselves insufficient as a matter of law to support
1

Except as to the findings that Hyrum's performance had deteriorated and that Mr.
Doyle had engaged in parental interference - for which issues there was no sufficient
evidence.
2

the legal conclusion that there had been a material] and substantial change of
circumstances - and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's
decision. Accordingly, Petitioner contends that the Court 6f Appeals should be reviewed
for correctness. Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 2002 UT 99, \ 14,61 P.3d
1009 (holding that a successful challenge to a finding of fact requires a marshalling of the
facts, whereas a successful challenge to a legal determination does not).
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preserved |for review by this Court when
it was timely presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. (On file with the Court and
dated November 30, 2009). In addition, this Court granted certiorari to review this very
issue in its January 20, 2010 Order. (See Appendix A, at %j).
Issue 3: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's
modification of child support based on Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Standard of Review:

The Supreme Court reviews the Court of Appeals'

conclusions of law for correctness and grants them no deference. Reese, 1999 UT 75,1j
10. It is incorrect for a court to modify an existing child support order that has not been
appealed, that has not been petitioned for according to a substantial change in
circumstance, and that was not made in error. Furthermore, although Rule 54(c)(1)
permits relief on grounds not pleaded, that rule does notl go so far as to authorize the
granting of relief on issues neither raised nor tried. Comlbe v. Warren's Family DriveInns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984).
Preservation of the Issue: This issue was preservedjfor review by this Court when
it was timely presented in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari. (On file with the Court and
3

dated November 30, 2009). In addition, this Court granted certiorari to review this very
issue in its January 20, 2010 Order. (See Appendix A, at ^3).
STATUTES AND RULES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default,
every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party had not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
Utah Code § 30-3-5(1) provides, in relevant part:
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and
parties.
Utah Code § 30-3-10.4 provides, in relevant part:
(1)
On the motion of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal
custodians if they are not the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modify
an order that established custody if:
(a) the circumstances of the child or one or both custodians have
materially and substantially changed since the entry of the order to
be modified; and
(b) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order would
be an improvement for and in the best interest of the child.
Utah Code § 786-12-210(3) provides:
A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclusion that
complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award amount
resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, or not in the
best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the presumption in
that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through findings, it is considered a
deviated order.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This matter concerns the divorce of Douglas and R(ft>in Doyle. A two-day bench
trial was held in December 2004, before Judge Frank Noel of the Third District Court in which the issue of custody of the parties minor son, H^yrum (then age 8), was fully
litigated. (See, e.g., Record, at 585-90). A Decree of Divorce was subsequently entered
on February 28, 2005. (Id., at 639-44). The decree awarded sole custody of Hyrum to
Mr. Doyle. (Id, at 639, Tf 2). It further provided that "in the event that [Ms. Doyle]
relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical custody
and shall share time equally . . . . " (Id.).
Shortly after trial, Mr. Doyle filed a Rule 59 Motion for New Trial. (Id, at 73132). Ms. Doyle also filed a Rule 60 Motion for Relief from Judgment. (Id, at 769-70).
These motions were heard by Judge Himonas, who granted the former and denied the
later.

In short, Judge Himonas determined that the "automatic" change in custody

provision in the divorce decree was not legally permissible - as a change of custody
required notice and a hearing. (Id, at 913-15, % 3.b.). Nbtably, Ms. Doyle had moved
from Denver to Salt Lake City in May 2005.
On October 11, 2005, Ms. Doyle filed a Verified Pbtition for Modification of the
original Decree of Divorce. (Id., at 865-69). Notably, the petition did not include a
request for child support. (See id.).
On September 19, 2007, the trial court granted Mr. Doyle's Motion for Bifurcated
Hearing. (Id., at 1600). More specifically, the trial court stated that "judicial economy is
best served by having the material change issue presented Ifirst,but the parties should be
5

prepared to immediately proceed to presentation of the substantive case if the Court
determines the threshold issue has been satisfied." {Id., at 1601).
The matter was tried before Judge Lindberg on October 2 & 3, 2007. At the
beginning of trial, the court reversed its decision to bifurcate the trial—allowing Ms.
Doyle to present her entire case at one time. The issues tried were limited to custodial
modification.

No evidence regarding child support was received. After trial, Judge

Lindberg awarded sole legal custody to Ms. Doyle, and parent-time to Mr. Doyle. The
trial court entered an Interim Order of Modification awarding the same on March 19,
2008. (Id, at 1796-97).
In the meantime, between the end of trial and the entry of the interim order,
counsel for Ms. Doyle submitted a proposed order - which also included a proposed
order modifying child support. Petitioner objected to the same on January 9, 2008. (Id.,
at 1650-54). The trial court subsequently scheduled a non-evidentiary hearing on the
objection. The hearing was held on March 19, 2008. No testimony was given at this
time. Rather, at the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to submit briefing on the
issue of whether child support modification was appropriate in this case. Petitioner
submitted his brief on this issue on March 31, 2008. (Id, at 1798-1810).
On May 7, 2008, the Court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law.
(Record, at 1937-57 - a true and accurate copy of which is attached and hereinafter
referred to as "Appendix C").

Therein, the trial court found that a substantial and

material change of circumstances had occurred since the entry of the divorce decree, and
that a change in custody was in the best interest of the child. (Id., at ^ 17-25, 40-41).
6

On May 20, 2008, the Court issued its Memorandum Decision regarding child support which order awarded the same to Ms. Doyle. (Record, at 1978-92).
The Court subsequently entered an Order of Modification on July 23, 2008.
(Record, at 2013-27 - hereinafter referred to as "Appendix D"). Therein, Ms. Doyle was
granted sole custody, care, and control of Hyrum, subject to reasonable parent time. (Id.,
at fflf 2-4). The Order of Modification also required that Mr. Doyle should pay child
support. (Id., at fflf 7-12). Thereafter, Mr. Doyle timely filed his Notice of Appeal.
(Record, at 1998, 2042).
The Court of Appeals issued its decision - via published opinion - on October 29,
2009. (See Appendix B). The Court of Appeals reversed) in part, and affirmed, in part.
In sum, the Court of Appeals ruled that complete bifurcatibn of the custody modification
was not required under Hogge v. Hogge. (See id., at ^ 1 It 14). Furthermore, the Court of
Appeals ruled that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court's
determination that a change in circumstances existed. (See id., atfflf15-17). Finally, the
Court of Appeals ruled modification of child support wfas legally appropriate - even
though not requested in Ms. Doyle's petition - however, that the trial court had erred in
determining the amount of the same. (See id., atfflf19-26)^
On November 30, 2009, Mr. Doyle timely filed his I Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
This Court granted the same on January 20, 2010. (See Appendix A).
STATEMENT OF THE FACT^I

1.

This action was instituted on June 9, 2003, when Mr. Doyle filed a

Divorce Petition in the Third District Court. (Record, at 146).
7

2.

The parties have one child together - namely, Hyrum Doyle (DOB

07/29/1996). Hyrum suffers from a degenerative neuromuscular disorder, which causes
his muscles to weaken, so he wears leg braces. Hyrum also has communication and
learning disorders, and has been in special education classes since age 4. (See Transcript
1, at 36-37 - also marked as Record, 2044).
3.

As mentioned above, a two-day bench trial was held in December 2004

- in which the issue of custody of the parties minor son was fully litigated.

(See, e.g.,

Record, at 585-90). A Decree of Divorce was subsequently entered on February 28,
2005. (M, at 639-44).
4.

At the time of the divorce decree, Ms. Doyle lived in Colorado.

(Transcript I, at 23).
5.

On May 9, 2005, Ms. Doyle returned to the Salt Lake Valley. (Id, at

25). It is undisputed that Ms. Doyle relocated in reliance upon the "automatic change"
provision found in the divorce decree. (Id., at 30).
6.

As previously indicated, the "automatic change" provision was

subsequently found to be null and void. Thus, Ms. Doyle was prompted to file her
Verified Petition for Modification, on October 11, 2005.
7.

A two-day bench trial subsequently commenced, as scheduled, on

October 2 & 3, 2007. (See Record, at 1642-43, 1648-49).
8.

At trial, the court allowed Ms. Doyle, over Mr. Doyle's objection, to

present concurrent evidence on both the issue of whether a material and substantial
change in circumstances had occurred and the issue of whether a change in custody was
8

in the best interests of the child. (See Transcript I, at 1-8; \see also Appendix C, at ^ 14.)
9.

The trial court stated that the reason for allowing evidence touching

upon changed circumstances and best interests at the same time was that it is
"unreasonable to expect" certain witnesses "who [are] very busy . . . to come in and
testify twice at different points in the proceedings . . . . " (S$e, Transcript I, at 8).
10.

Judge Lindberg then stated: "You will jhave to trust me to consider

those matters correctly . . . . But at this point I am going toi receive the testimony." (Id.).
Accordingly, the trial court heard evidence on whether a Change in custody would be in
the best interests of Hyrum before the Court ruled on whether there was, in fact, a change
in circumstances underpinning the original divorce decree.
11.

During trial, the court heard evidence ftorn several witnesses on the

issue of change in circumstances. For the purposes of this| appeal, such evidence largely
consisted of testimony regarding Hyrum's social and academic functioning - as well as
testimony regarding Mr. Doyle's alleged marginalization of Ms. Doyle's relationship
with her son.
12.

Regarding the issues of social and academic functioning, testimony was

received at trial:
a. From school personnel, that while Hyrum was behind in grade-level
in science and language arts, that he was on track in respect to
mathematics. (Transcript I, at 175-76). And, that while Hyrum was

9

still behind in some areas, he was making an improvement. {Id., at
194).
b. That while Mr. Doyle decided to remove Hyrum from special
education {Id., at 48), Ms. Doyle was also present when that decision
was made. (Id, at 180, 205-06).
c. That Mr. Doyle decided to remove Hyrum from special education
because he did not believe it was producing results, and only served
to further alienate Hyrum from his peers. (Transcript II, at 334 also marked as Record, 2045).
d. That Mr. Doyle removed Hyrum from special education in order to
begin working with him at home. (Id., at 395).
e. From Hyrum's then-current teacher, that she believed he was getting
good at getting his work done (Transcript I, at 158), and that his
math skills were also improving. (Id., at 162).
f. That Dr. Kingston - Hyrum's therapist - also related that Hyrum
was making progress academically because of changes in his home
environment. (Id., at 91 -92).
g. That Dr. Hale - the court-appointed custody evaluator - did not
believe Dr. Kingston had recommended that Hyrum continue in
special education. (Id., at 105-106).
h. That Mr. Doyle also removed Hyrum from special education
because he wished to transfer Hyrum to a different school.
10

(Transcript II, at 353-55). And, that th0 principal of Hyrum's school
did not oppose the transfer. {Id., at 35^).
i. That Mr. Doyle believed there was some evidence that Hyrum was
suffering from bullying at school. (Id,{ at 331). And, that Mr. Doyle
believed Hyrum had no friends at school. (Id, at 334).
j.

That Hyrum's fourth grade teacher belileved he was always a socially
awkward kid. (Transcript I, at 180).

k. That Hyrum's fifth & sixth grade teacher also believed he had a hard
time fitting in. (Id, at 153).
1. That Dr. Hale believed Hyrum was socially and psychologically less
sophisticated from the outset of her custody evaluation. (Id., at 66).
m. And, that Hyrum had often excluded himself socially for many years
- for example, that he had been spending recess walking around the
school yard by himself since first grade (Transcript II, at 337).
Regarding the parental alienation issue, testimony was received at trial:
a. From Dr. Hale, that Mr. Doyle had unplugged the telephone while
Hyrum was talking to his mother. (Ijranscript I, at 93). However,
Mr. Doyle clarified that he only prohibited Hyrum from calling his
mother when it was for the third or fourth time in a given day.
(Transcript II, at 331).
b. That Mr. Doyle had not allowed Ms. iDoyle to attend Hyrum's IEP
conference in March 2005. (Transcript I, at 31-32).
11

c. That Mr. Doyle had requested Ms. Doyle not be directly provided
with copies of Hyrum's records from school. (Transcript II, at 35859).
d. That Hyrum believed Mr. Doyle had not assisted him in purchasing
gifts for his mother - even though Ms. Doyle had assisted him in
purchasing gifts for his father. (Transcript I, at 71).
Nonetheless, the court also heard evidence on this same issue:
a. That Ms. Doyle had not been denied any parenting time since the
custody order had been modified in November 2005. (Id., at 30-31).
b. That Ms. Doyle freely admitted that it was Mr. Doyle's parental
right to exclude her from the IEP conference. (Id., at 31).
c. That Mr. Doyle was unaware that Ms. Doyle has intended upon
coming to the IEP conference until he was informed by school
personnel. (Transcript II, at 380).
d. That Mr. Doyle had invited Ms. Doyle to all future conferences.
(Id, at 384).

And, that he did not object to Ms. Doyle being

involved in Hyrum's school planning meetings. (Id, at 403).
e. That Mr. Doyle had also provided copies of Hyrum's school records
to Ms. Doyle voluntarily. (Id., at 360).
f. That Ms. Doyle had not been excluded from other educational events
or academic decisions - and, in fact, that she herself had often
volunteered at Hyrum's school. (Transcript I, at 155).
12

g. That Dr. Hale did not believe that Hyrum was exhibiting any signs
of a child suffering from parental alienation. (Id., at 219).
15.

On the first day of trial, Dr. Hale was permitted to testify not only to

issues surrounding change in circumstance, but also to matters that clearly went to the
issue of best interest. For example, Dr. Hale testified:
a. That Hyrum's preference was to be with his mother - as well as
testifying to other Rule 4-903 considerations. (Transcript I, at 67,
218-21).
b. That she believed that Mr. Doyle was Obsessive-Compulsive, and
that such a disorder would have an effect upon his parenting. (Id., at
95-97).
c. That Ms. Doyle had historically exhibited symptoms of psychotic
thinking (id., at 121), but that she had no concerns about Ms.
Doyle's present psychological well-being. (Id, at 143).
d. That she also had no concerns about Nls. Doyle's ability to parent as
a single mother, if she were given sole! custody. (Id., at 144, 211).
e. That Ms. Doyle's parenting style woi^ld be a good fit with Hyrum's
needs were she granted sole custody. (Id., at 214).
f. That she believed Ms. Doyle was more likely to co-parent with Mr.
Doyle - than he with she - if she were granted sole custody. (Id., at
218).

13

16.

Ms. Doyle used the entire first day of trial, and much of the morning of

the second day of trial presenting her case on all issues. Consequently, as the matter had
been limited to a two-day trial, Mr. Doyle was unable to present any evidence until after
the mid-morning break of the second day of trial. (See Transcript II, at 313).
17.

However, before Mr. Doyle could put on any evidence, Judge Lindberg

ruled from the bench that the Court had indeed found a material change of circumstances.
(See/<£, at 254-63).
18.

Mr. Doyle objected to the Court's ruling from the bench, and orally

moved for a mistrial because he had not been permitted to put on evidence of the lack of
a change in circumstances. (See id., at 260-61.)
19.

The court responded that the parties may treat her determination as

"preliminary," denied the motion for mistrial, and reopened evidence. (Id).
20.

Thereafter, the court continued to receive evidence on both elements of

custody modification - change in circumstances and best interest.
21.

During the course of the entire trial, the court did not receive any

evidence regarding the modification of child support. (Id., at 466).
22.

On May 7, 2008, the Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law. (See Appendix C). The Court concluded that Ms. Doyle had proven, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial and material change in circumstances
had occurred - thus, justifying a modification of custody in the case. (See id., at f 40).
23.

More specifically, the trial court found that each of the following

constituted a change in circumstance:
14

a. That Ms. Doyle had moved back to Salt Lake City in reliance upon
the "automatic change" in custody provision of the divorce decree.
0W.,at^jl8).
b. That the parties were faced with a new legal interpretation of the
divorce decree upon the nullification of the "automatic change"
provision by Judge Himonas. {Id., at ^[119).
c. That while the divorce decree anticipated that Mr. Doyle's parenting
skills would improve, Mr. Doyle continued to rely upon corporal
punishment in disciplining Hyrum. (Id\., at f 21).
d. That Hyrum's social, educational, and psychological functioning had
deteriorated. {Id., at ^} 23).
e. And, that Mr. Doyle had attempted to marginalize Ms. Doyle's
relationship with her son. (Id., at ^f 25).
24.

The trial court also found that Hyrum's best interests were met by a

change in custody. Accordingly, the trial court granted Ms. Doyle sole legal and physical
custody, with liberal parent-time to Mr. Doyle. (See id., at f 41).
25.

On July 23, 2008, the Court entered an Order of Modification - based

upon the aforementioned findings and conclusions. (See Appendix D).
26.

This appeal timely followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the tridl court's refusal to formally
bifurcate the child modification hearing. Admission of "best interest" evidence prior to a
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finding that a substantial and material change in circumstances had occurred violates the
rule established by this Court in Hogge v. Hogge and its progeny. This is especially true
in cases where, like the instant case, the issue of child custody was fully litigated - as
opposed to simply stipulated. The Court of Appeals failed to make this key distinction.
As such, the Court of Appeal's decision offends the doctrine of res judicata. Likewise,
Mr. Doyle was prejudiced by the failure to bifurcate because any subsequent finding of
changed circumstance would have been tainted with "best interest'' evidence.
The Court of Appeals also erred - as a matter of law - in affirming the trial court's
finding of a change in circumstances. Under Utah law, a change in circumstances must
be based upon a change in the custodial parent's ability or the functioning of the custodial
relationship. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
despite the fact that the findings did not meet this requirement. Rather, several of the
findings focused on the change in Ms. Doyle's, the non-custodial parents, circumstances.
This is impermissible. Likewise, one of the findings was based upon the fact that there
was no change at all. This is illogical. The remaining findings were either not related to
a change in the custodial relationship, offensive to sound judicial policy, or did not - as a
matter of law - arise to level warranting a change of custody. Alternatively, at least two
of the findings of fact were not supported by sufficient evidence.
The Court of Appeals further erred when it affirmed the trial court's modification
of child support - although Ms. Doyle had requested no such change in her Petition to
Modify. The Court of Appeals correctly noted that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c)
allows the courts to grant relief even if the party had not requested it in its pleadings.
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This rule, however, is not absolute. Rather, subsequent case law has restricted the courts
from granting relief where the issue in question was neither raised nor tried. In the
instant case, no evidence was received at trial regarding the modification of child support
- and thus, Petitioner was denied a proper hearing on this issue.
ARGUMENT

I.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's refusal to
formally bifurcate the reception of evidence at the custody hearing relating to
a change in circumstances and best interest of the parties' child.
Under Utah law, a trial court may, after a hearing, modify an order that established

custody, if: (a) the circumstances of the child or the custodian(s) has materially and
substantially changed since the entry of the order, and (b) the modification of the terms
and conditions of the order would be an improvement and ih the best interest of the child.
UTAH CODE

§ 30-3-10.4(1) (2009); see also UTAH R. CIV. F. 106.

In Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51 (1982), the Utah Supreme Court adopted a
bifurcated procedure for determining issues of custody modification. Namely, a party
seeking modification must demonstrate: (1) that since thq time of the previous decree,
there have been changes in the circumstances upon which t)he previous award was based,
and (2) that those changes are sufficiently substantial and material to justify the
reopening of the custody issue. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54.
Furthermore, the Hogge court elaborated the mechanics by which the bifurcated
procedure should take place. It explained that the trial court must first make a separate
finding on issue of whether a petitioner has met the burden las to change in circumstances.
Id. "If so, the court, either as a continuation of the same hearing, or in a separate
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hearing, will proceed to the second step." Id. (emphasis added). Only then shall the
court consider "evidence relevant to the welfare or best interest of the child." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed

and further clarified the bifurcation

requirements in Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608 (1984). There, the court stated that "[i]n
the initial step, the [trial] court will receive evidence only as to the nature and materiality
of any changes in those circumstances upon which the earlier award of custody was
based." Becker, 69A P.2d at 610 (emphasis added). Moreover, the court added that:
"[t]he required showing of materiality is to be distinguished from the evidence that is
appropriately presented in the second phase of the proceeding . . . . " Id.
Thus, according to both Hogge and Becker, "best interest" evidence cannot and
must not be received by the trial court before a material change in circumstance has been
found. This requirement is clear and unambiguous. Furthermore, a failure to abide by
this bifurcated process constitutes reversible error. Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 943, 946.
Nevertheless, in the instant case, the Court of Appeals affirmed District Court's
decision not to completely bifurcate the modification hearing. (Appendix B, at \ 14).
This constitutes reversible error by the Court of Appeals.
The facts below establish that prior to trial, Mr. Doyle filed an unopposed motion
to bifurcate the hearing. The trial court granted that motion on September 19, 2007.

2

For example, the facts in Hogge illustrate that the district court had properly
followed the bifurcated procedure in that case. At the hearing on the petition to modify,
the respondent had produced ample evidence that she had overcome serious emotional
problems. Based upon this evidence, the district court found a change in circumstance.
Only then did the district court proceed to a de novo consideration of all evidence bearing
upon the best interest of the children. Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54-55.
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(Record, at 1600). Yet, at the October 2007 trial, and over the objection of Mr. Doyle,
Judge Lindberg allowed Ms. Doyle to proceed by presenting concurrent evidence on both
the issues of whether a material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred
and whether a change in custody was in the best interest of the child. {See Transcript I, at
1-8; see also Appendix C, atfflf1-4).
On appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the assertion that "change in
circumstance" and "best interest" evidence must be presented separately. (Appendix B,
at ^[ 12). On this point, it stated that: "[although the analytical framework requiring
bifurcation of these determinations is clear, 'this framework says nothing . . . about how
a trial court must receive evidence.'" {Id., at \ 13). Thel Court of Appeals here relied
upon Huish v. Munro, 2008 UT App 283, 191 P.3d 1242, in making this decision. This
reliance, however, is misplaced in at least two respects.
First, the Utah Supreme Court has clearly defined the procedures by which the
trial court must receive evidence in custody modifications. These procedures, which
require a bifurcated process in cases which have previously been fully litigated, are set
forth in Hogge and Becker, supra.
Second, Huish is not factually on point. Huish did not involve the modification of
a litigated custody decree (as in the instant case), but rather the custody decree in Huish
had been stipulated to by the parties. See Huish, 2008 UT App 283, f 14, 191 P.3d at
1242. In contrast, the child custody order which was modified in the instant case was
reached only after a two-day trial in December 2004. {See Record, at 585-90). This
distinction is crucial. Moreover, this distinction appears to be the source of the Court of
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Appeals' error in the present case. Taken in full, the quotation upon which the Court of
Appeals has mistakenly relied, states:
This framework says nothing, however, about how a trial
court must receive evidence. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court
has said, since Hogge, that "in change of custody cases
involving a nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court, in
applying the change-circumstances test, should receive
evidence on changed circumstances and that evidence may
include evidence that pertains to the best interest of the
child."
Id., at ^f 17 (emphasis added). In short, Huish is inapplicable in the present case.
Moreover, it is the source of the Court of Appeal's principle error in this case.
Likewise, the Court of Appeals' reliance upon Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), is similarly misplaced. (See Appendix B, at ^j 13). Once again,
Walton involved the modification of a child custody decree based upon a stipulation.
Walton, 814 P.2d at 620. Furthermore, the Walton court elaborated why this distinction
was critical in the application of Hogge:
This rule [established in Hogge] was later qualified in Elmer
[v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989)], which held that "in
change of custody cases involving a nonlitigated custody
decree, a trial court, in applying the changed circumstances
test, should receive evidence on changed circumstances and
that evidence may include evidence which pertains to the best
interest of the child."
J

The Court of Appeals' reliance upon Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507 (Utah 1985),
is likewise misplaced. (See Appendix B, at f 13). First, the Court of Appeals is relying
upon language found in a concurring opinion. This is not binding authority, but mere
dicta. Second, Moody is not factually on point. There, again, the parties entered into a
joint custody decree via stipulation. Id., at 507. Moreover, the pleadings and supporting
affidavits (filed by both of the parties) admitted that "the constant changing of the
children [had] resulted in a circumstance which [was] not in their best interest." Id., at
509. Accordingly, Moody should be limited to it facts.
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Id., at 621 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Walton court continued:
The reasoning behind tempering the Hogge-Becker rule in
nonlitigated custody decrees is plain: |Too rigid an
application of the rule . . . would lock a child!into the custody
of one parent or the other where there has been no
determination on the merits of parenting ability of either
parent...."
Id. (emphasis added). As the issue of child custody wasl litigated in the present case,
Walton and Elmer are simply not applicable; the Court of Appeals erred in following
these cases.4
In a similar vein, the Hogge court explained that the need for a preliminary
showing of substantial or material change in circumstances is necessary because "a
custody decree is predicated on a particular set of facts." Hpgge, 649 P.2d at 53. That is,
because the custody decree is res judicata, it should notl be modified unless changed
circumstances are conclusively demonstrated. Id. Res judicata, thus, necessitates the
bright-line division between "change in circumstance" ^nd "best interest" evidence.
Here, the Court of Appeals entirely ignored this distinction. Moreover, this necessity was
simply not present in Huish - the primary case upon whibh the Court of Appeals now
relies. See Huish, 2008 UT App 283, at ^f 15 ("Thus, in |situations like this one where
custody is determined by stipulation, res judicata should be applied much less rigidly

This conclusion is supported by other panels of the Utah Court of Appeals. See,
e.g, Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593 (Utah Ct. App. 199^) ("Specifically, while parties
to previously litigated custody cases may not introduce evidence of a change's effect on a
child's best interest in order to satisfy the threshold requirement of the Hogge-Becker
test, those in previously non-litigated cases may offer such "best interest" evidence
during both prongs of the Hogge analysis.").
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because an unadjudicated custody decree is not based on an objective, impartial
determination of the best interest of the child.5'). For this additional reason, Huish,
Walton, Elmer, and the like are simply not on point. Therefore, they cannot serve as the
basis for the Court of Appeals decision.
Finally, the Court of Appeals indicated that there was no showing that the trial
court merged its analysis of changed circumstances and best interest issues. (Appendix
B, at ^f 14). This line of reasoning is erroneous on at least two levels. First, it entirely
disregards the Hogge-Becker rule - as discussed above. Second, it disregards the natural
and deleterious effects that the rule is designed to prevent.
On this latter point, the record indicates that upon the commencement of the
second day of trial, Judge Lindberg entered a "preliminary" finding of changed
circumstances before going on to consider the second day of testimony. (See Transcript
II, at 260-61). Nevertheless, by the time the Judge Lindberg had made this "preliminary"
ruling, the court had already heard from several witnesses regarding the best interests of
the child - thus, tainting any finding of changed circumstances ab initio. For example,
and as previously mentioned, Dr. Hale testified to issues of child preference, past parental
conduct, present parental ability, likelihood of cooperating with a co-parent, and the like.
Such evidence clearly goes to "best interest" under Utah law. See UTAH CODE 30-3-10
(a) & (d) (listing examples of "best interest" evidence). By receiving evidence regarding
the best interests of the child before ever making a finding on the issue of whether a
material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred, the trial court was
prevented from objectively ruling on the material and substantial change issue. Any
22

finding of changed circumstances was irretrievably entangled with best interest evidence
at this point
Likewise, any "preliminary" finding was defective because Judge Lindberg
reached the same before Mr. Doyle had an opportunity to present evidence. Additionally,
the court cut-off Mr. Doyle and ended the trial before he had completed his presentation
of evidence concerning the lack of changed circumstances. (See Transcript II, at 313).
Thus, the trial court's failure to bifurcate these issues resulted in an irregularity in the
proceedings that deprived Mr. Doyle of a fair trial. In short, by failing to completely
bifurcate the trial, and by allowing Ms. Doyle to present all of her evidence on both the
change in circumstance and best interest of the child factors, the trial court effectively
allowed her an evidentiary advantage.
The Court of Appeals did not thoroughly address these latter arguments in its
opinion - save that it seemed to uphold the trial court's actions in terms of duplicative
evidence and judicial efficiency. (See Appendix B, at ^f 14). This position, however,
does not comport with Utah law. The schedules of the count, the parties, or the witnesses
should not take precedent over the need for bifurcation. Ihdeed, in Kramer v. Kramer,
738 P.2d 624 (1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that "[m]any areas of the law involve
bifurcated procedures at the trial level. We do not see why this one [i.e., child custody
modification] is unduly burdensome . . . change of circumstances involves a very narrow
spectrum of evidence. It should not be difficult for trial courts to keep the two separate."
Kramer, 738 P.2d at n.l. Such reasoning is directly applicable to the instant case.
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For each of these reasons, the Court of Appeals should be reversed. The District
Court's Order of Modification should likewise be vacated.
II.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's determination
that a substantial and material change in circumstances justified a
modification of custody.
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's determination that

substantial and material change justified a modification of custody. More specifically,
the Court of Appeals erred when it stated that five findings of fact amounted to an
implication "that the current custody arrangement had proven unworkable, and [that] this
by itself is sufficient to meet the changed circumstances threshold." (See Appendix B, at
^17). The Court of Appeals identified these findings as: (1) Ms. Doyle's relocation to
Salt Lake City, (2) the striking of the automatic joint custody provision in the original
decree, (3) a failure of improvement in Mr. Doyle's parenting skills, (4) Hyrum's
deteriorating social and academic performance, and (5) Mr. Doyle's attempt to exclude
Ms. Doyle from Hyrum's life. Id.
Yet, these five factors do not - as a matter of law - establish a change in
circumstances because all of them focus on issues extraneous to the custodial
relationship. Alternatively, the last two factors are not supported by sufficient evidence.
A.

Judge Himonas' interpretation of the custody decree was not a change
of circumstances

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court's determination that
the striking of the automatic change of custody provision constituted a substantial and
material change. (See Appendix B, at ^f 16). Utah law provides that a petition to modify
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custody will not be granted unless there was "a change in tthe circumstances upon which
the original custody award was based which substantially and materially affects the
custodial parent's parenting ability or the functioning of the custodial relationship. . . ."
Kramer, 738 P.2d at 625 (emphasis added) (hereinafter referred to as "the 'substantial
change in circumstances' test").
Judge Himonas' striking of the automatic change provision of the original divorce
decree cannot constitute a substantial and material change in circumstances. A prior
court's order cannot create a substantial and material change in circumstances because
the court's actions are not the type of actions which affect the relationship between a
custodial parent and child. Judge Himonas simply interpreted an order and ruled that the
automatic change provision was an unlawful provision of the original divorce decree.
His decision did not concern Mr. Doyle's relationship with his son. Rather, it simply
affirmed that Utah law requires custody modification to proceed through a petition to
modify. See Hogge, 649 P.2d at 53-54 (changes to the custodial relationship may only be
made through a petition to modify).5 Interestingly, neither party appealed this ruling.
Furthermore, Judge Noel's desire that the parents share custody if Ms. Doyle's
relocated is also immaterial. There is simply no legal basi$ which meets the "substantial
change in circumstances" test when such a desire fails to materialize. Rather, child

This procedure is necessary for several reasons. Flirst, a previous child custody
decree should be accorded deference through the doctrine of res judicata. See Hogge,
649 P.2d at 53-54. Second, altering child custody solely through modification
proceedings, with their attendant high standards, protects I the integrity of the custodial
relationship from constant challenges and "ping-pong" sceriarios. Id.
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custody determinations must be based on presently existing facts. See id, at 52. For this
additional reason, the Court of Appeals was in error.

B.

Ms. Doyle's relocation cannot constitute a change of circumstances

The Court of Appeals also erred when it determined that Ms. Doyle's relocation
from Denver constituted a material change in circumstances. (See Appendix B, at f 16).
It is undisputed that Ms. Doyle specifically relied upon the terms of the original custody
decree that provided for joint custody upon her relocation. (Transcript II, at 30).
Nevertheless, under Utah law, a parent seeking modification of a child custody
order "must show that there has been a change in the circumstances upon which the
original custody award was based which substantially and materially affects the custodial
parent's parenting ability or the functioning of the custodial relationship. . . ." Kramer,
738 P.2d at 625 (emphasis added). Established precedent holds that inquiries as to
whether a sufficient change in circumstances occurred focus on the custodial parent's
situation and ability - not on changes in the non-custodial parent's situation.

For

example, a non-custodial parent's subsequent marriage, improved financial situation, or
other improvements are not the types of changes that suffice to disturb the custodial
relationship. See Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54.
The reason the change of circumstances test is focused on the custodial parent is
because it is designed "to protect the custodial parent from harassment by repeated
litigation and to protect the child from 4ping-pong' custody awards." Kramer, 738 P.2d
at 626. In short, the change of circumstances inquiry focuses on the custodial parent to
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avoid instability of parental relations. Notably, Ms. Doyl0 filed her Rule 60 Motion for
Relief from Judgment less than three months after the Decree of Divorce had been
entered. (Record, at 639-44, 769-770). Thus, the Court c^f Appeals erred when it held
that a non-custodial parent's change of residence could support a modification of a
litigated child custody decree.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal's decision regarding relocation cannot be
supported based upon the "unusual legal and factual dhanges in this case."

{See

Appendix B, at ^[17). Procedural irregularities and substahtive errors in this case do not
constitute a reason to depart from Utah law regarding change of circumstances. First, the
claimed "unique procedural and substantive element" was here an unlawful provision.
The automatic change provision was of no legal effect from! its inception.
Likewise, Ms. Doyle's mistaken reliance on the same does not constitute a
substantial change in circumstances.
custodial relationship.

Once again, her reliance had no affect on the

Her intent in relocating is irrelevant in the modification

proceedings because the fact of her relocation itself did not affect the custodial
relationship. See Kramer, 738 P.2d at 625. In sum, it simply had no bearing upon
whether the custodial relationship succeeds or fails. For this additional reason, the Court
of Appeals should be reversed.
C.

Mr, Doyle's alleged failure to make parental improvements does not
constitute a change in circumstance

The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the Itrial court's finding that Mr.
Doyle's failure to improve his parenting skills (as anticipated in the Decree of Divorce)
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constituted a substantial change in circumstances. {See Appendix B, at f 16). Such a
finding is legally insufficient to constitute a change in circumstances, because, as a matter
of law, it does not comprise a change from the original decree.
The Court of Appeals' ruling constitutes reversible error.

Quite simply,

modification of custody requires a change in the custodial relationship; absent a proven
change in parental behavior, custody cannot be modified. See Kramer, 738 P.2d at 625.
In the instant case, there was no concomitant finding that Mr. Doyle's parenting had
diminished in any respect.

Indeed, both courts specifically found that Mr. Doyle's

behavior had not changed. {See Appendix B, at f 17; Appendix C, at f 21). Such a
finding, by definition, precludes a change in circumstance. For this reason alone, the
Court of Appeals should be reversed.
Furthermore, the fact that Judge Noel anticipated an allegedly unfulfilled parental
improvement on Mr. Doyle's part does not support a ruling that a change in
circumstances exists. As previously indicated, child custody determinations must be
based on presently existing facts. See Hogge, 649 P.2d at 52. For this additional reason,
the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
D.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
Hyrum's social and academic deterioration constituted a change in
circumstances

The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the trial court's finding that Hyrum's
social and academic deterioration constituted a change in circumstances. In short, these
findings were not correlated to a concomitant change in the custodial relationship - and
thus, fail as a matter of law. Alternatively, the evidence presented at trial is insufficient
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to support this finding. Finally, sound policy reasons urge against modifying custody
based upon these considerations.
Under Utah law, a party seeking modification mu$t show that there has been a
change in circumstances which substantially and materially affects the custodial parent's
parenting ability or the functioning of the custodial relatibnship. Kramer, 738 P.2d at
625. It is not enough for a party to show that a child hasi underperformed. Rather, the
party seeking modification must prove, and the court hmst find, that the custodial
parent's abilities or relationship have materially and substantially changed. Id. at 625.
In the instant case, there has been no finding that causally links an alleged
decrease in Hyrum's performance to either a change in Mi*. Doyle's parenting ability or
to a change in the relationship between Mr. Doyle and Hyrum. Furthermore, there is no
finding that establishes a baseline concerning Hyrum's abilities. In order to show a
change, there has to be a baseline from which to measurei See, e.g., Reid v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 116 P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1989) ("The [trial court's factual] findings
must be articulated with sufficient detail so that the basis of the ultimate conclusion can
be understood.").

It was undisputed at trial that HyrUm has special needs - both

academically and physically. (Transcript I, at 36-37).

Iti addition, Hyrum had shown

special needs since he was a pre-schooler. (Id.). Accordingly, the need for a baseline
finding is all the more critical in this case.
Furthermore, the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the finding
that Hyrum was deteriorating both academically and socially. For instance, while the
evidence did show that Hyrum was behind grade-level in science and language arts, it
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also showed that he was making improvement in mathematics. (Transcript I, at 175-76).
Dr. Kingston and others also related that Hyrum was making progress in these areas.
(Id., at 91-92, 158, 162, 194). Once more, while there was some evidence that Hyrum
was suffering from bullying at school - which does not constitute evidence of change there was no evidence that Hyrum ever had many friends. (Transcript I, at 153, 180;
Transcript II, at 331, 334). To the contrary, the evidence showed that Hyrum had often
excluded himself socially for many years. (Transcript II, at 337).
Finally, subjecting custody to a child's performance alone violates the sound
judicial policy of protecting the integrity of custodial arrangements - so as to benefit the
long-term welfare of the child. See Hogge, 649 P.2d at 54. This is especially important
in cases involving children with learning or other neurological disabilities. In such a
situation, difficulty in the child's academic and social performance may relate to a wide
stratum of factors unrelated to the custodial relationship. Absent clear factual findings
linking the diminished performance to parenting, special needs children run a greater risk
of having custodial relationships disturbed.

For this additional reason, the Court of

Appeals should be reversed.
E.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that
Mr. Doyle had attempted to marginalize Ms. Doyle's relationship with
her son

Finally, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that Mr.
Doyle had attempted to marginalize Ms. Doyle relationship with Hyrum. (See Appendix
B, at ^f 16). The trial court found that this attempt was manifest in actions such as
unplugging the phone and restricting other contacts between Hyrum and his mother. (See
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Appendix C, at f 25). As fully set forth below, this findihg cannot, as a matter of law,
support a change in custody. Alternatively, the evidence presented at trial is insufficient
to support this finding.
The testimony presented at trial demonstrated that Mr. Doyle unplugged the
telephone while Hyrum was talking with his mother.

(Transcript I, at 93). It also

demonstrated that Mr. Doyle had not allowed Ms. Doyle to attend Hyrum's IEP
conference in March 2005. (Id., at 31-32). And that Mr. I^oyle had requested the school
not provide Ms. Doyle with direct access to Hyrunf s school records. (Transcript II, at
358-59). Finally, it demonstrated that Mr. Doyle had not assisted Hyrum in purchasing a
present for Ms. Doyle. (Transcript I, at 71). Even taking these allegations as true, they
do not rise to a level warranting a change in circumstance finding.
Indeed, there was no finding that Mr. Doyle had ever denied Ms. Doyle visitation
with Hyrum, or that he had ever failed to provide her t*dth the right of first refusal
regarding Hyrum's care. In fact, Ms. Doyle admitted that she had not been denied any
such parenting time since the custody order was clarified in November 2005. (Transcript
I, at 30-31). Likewise, Ms. Doyle admitted that it was |Mr. Doyle's parental right to
exclude her from the IEP conference. (Id., at 31). On that isame note, Mr. Doyle testified
that he was not aware that Ms. Doyle was coming from Denver to attend the conference
until that same day.

(Transcript II, at 380). Likewise^ he invited her to all future

conferences (id, at 384), and voluntarily provided her w|th all school records. (Id, at
360).

In addition, there was no evidence presented th^t Ms. Doyle had ever been

excluded from any other educational events or academic decisions - and, in fact, she
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herself testified that she often volunteered at Hyrum's school. (Transcript I, at 155).
Moreover, Dr. Hale testified that Hyrum did not exhibit any signs of a child suffering
from parental alienation. {Id., at 219).
The case of Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), suggests that the
facts in the instant case do not warrant a change of custody. In Sigg, the custodial parent
left the country without informing the non-custodial parent, declined to provide the noncustodial parent with effective contact information for the children, unilaterally required
supervised visitation, and arranged to have the non-custodial parent arrested on trumpedup harassment charges when the non-custodial parent was expecting to exercise
visitation. Id, at 910-11. Based upon these facts, the Sigg court ruled that acts of
custodial interference could constitute a material change in circumstance. Id., at 913.
Notably, however, the court stated that such interference must arise to levels of
"constant" and "egregious" denials of visitation before a change of custody should be
ordered. Id., at 915.
The Sigg court held that modification of custody based on custodial interference
should only be permitted in extreme circumstances. Id. at 915. It also specifically
cautioned that "changing the custodial parent is a serious step and can have far reaching
implications for the children. Generally, it is in a child's best interest to have custody
stabilized with one parent."

Id.

Modification based upon custodial interference,

therefore, is only justifiable in extreme cases. Id. The instant case does not present an
"extreme case." Isolated instances of disagreeable conduct cannot support a modification
of custody because it is in a child's best interest to have custody stabilized with one
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parent. Absent findings of extreme circumstances of custodial interference, it is error to
modify child custody. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals should be reversed.
III.

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the District Court's modification of
child support based on Rule 54(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court of Appeals erred when it found that, pursuant to Rule 54(c)(1) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court had the authority to modify its previous
child support order without notice to the parties and an opportunity for Petitioner to be
heard on that issue. (See Appendix B, atfflf20-23 ).6 Respondent did not request that the
trial court modify child support when she petitioned th0 court for a modification of
custody. (See Record, at 865-69). It was not until afteir the evidentiary hearing was
completed on the modification of custody that the trial court expressed its intent to
modify child support as well.
The Court of Appeals correctly noted that Rule 54(c)(1) states, in pertinent part,
that "every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in its pleadings."
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c)(1). However, in Combe v. Warren's Family Drive-Inns, Inc., 680
P.2d 733 (Utah 1984), this Court made it clear that "[ajlfchough Rule 54(c)(1) permits
The Court of Appeals also addressed the related iissue of whether the District
Court erred in determining the amount of child support un^ier Utah Code § 78B-12-301.
It determined that since the 2005 Divorce Decree clearly included a child support order
that the amount of child support should be determined under the table contained in
subsection (1) of the aforementioned provision. (See Appendix B, at fflj 25-26).
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a determination of the
amount Mr. Doyle must pay in accordance with the same. \(See Appendix B, at ^ 26). In
so far as the modification of the child support order was legally appropriate (a point that
Petitioner does not concede), Petitioner does not take is^ue with the determination of
Court of Appeals concerning its amount.
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relief on grounds not pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to authorize the granting of
relief on issues neither raised nor tried" Id. at 735 (emphasis added).
In modifying and establishing a child support award, the trial court is required by
statute to make a number of factual findings.

See, e.g., UTAH CODE §78B-12-210.

Moreover, while the child support guidelines are to be applied as a rebuttable
presumption, Petitioner is entitled to put on evidence to rebut that presumption by
showing that "an award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust,
inappropriate, or not in the best interest of the child in a particular case . . . ." UTAH
CODE §78B-12-210(3). Petitioner was deprived of his opportunity to do so in this matter
- no testimony was given on this issue during trial or at the March 19, 2008 hearing.
{See, e.g., Transcript II, at 466).
The Court of Appeals' decision that the trial court could modify child support
without a hearing departs from the established precedent of this Court - as set forth in
Combe - because it allows the trial court to grant relief on an issue that was neither raised
nor tried. It, likewise, offends the doctrine of res judicata. See Mascaro v. Davis, 741
P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987) (one district court judge cannot overrule another district court
judge of equal authority).
Therefore, the Court of Appeals should be reversed.

The District Court's

modification of child support should be reversed and the issue remanded for an
evidentiary hearing.
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CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision not to
completely bifurcate the custody modification hearing. Ut^h law requires that "change in
circumstance" evidence be completely segregated from "begt interest" evidence when the
court is considering the modification of a child custody order that has been previously
litigated - as opposed to one that had been reached via stipulation. The Court of Appeals
failed to recognize this critical distinction.
The Court of Appeals also erred in affirming the trial court's decision that a
change in circumstance had occurred since the entry of the divorce decree. On this point
the Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law because ia "change in circumstances"
finding must focus on the custodial parent. Alternatively, the Court of Appeals affirmed
several of the trial court's findings - despite the fact that they were not supported by
substantial evidence.
The Court of Appeals further erred in affirming the tHal court's decision to modify
child support - especially when no such request was made in Ms. Doyle's Petition to
Modify. Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may receive
relief not requested in the pleadings, case law interpreting jthat provision does not allow
that such relief may be granted when the issues were neither raised or tried.
For each of these reasons, Mr. Doyle respectfully requests that the Court of
Appeals be reversed, that the District Court's Order of Modification be vacated, that the
case be remanded, and for any other just and proper relief.
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DATED this 11th day of March, 2009

Steve S. Christensen
Matt Anderson
Benjamin Lusty
Attorneys for Petitioner, Douglas Doyle
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GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:
H1
bouglas Patrick Doyle (Father) ap^eal$ the trial courtfs
order granting Robin Elaine Doyle's (M^thet*) motion to modify
custody of their son (Son), arguing th^t the court made a fatal
procedural error, incorrectly found a Substantial and material
change in circumstances had occurred, ^ n d erred in determining
that Mother's custody of Son would be i n s<bnfs best interest.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (2007). m addition, Father
argues that even if the trial court correctly modified custody,
it er re d in modifying child support because Mother had neither

spsqu^ced

nor was she entitled

to such

a

modification.

We affirm

in pa^t and reverse and remand in part for entry of a proper
child support order.
BACKGROUND
I2
Father and Mother were divorced by a [decree entered in
February 2005. Father, then residing i n Salt Lake City, Utah,

was granted sole legal and physical custody of Son.1 The decree
also afforded Mother, then residing in Denver, Colorado, the
following opportunity: "In the event [Mother] relocates to the
Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical
custody and shall share time equally in alternating weeks and on
holidays, as per standard schedule" (the joint custody
provision). Less than three months later, in early May 2005,
Mother moved back to the Salt Lake Valley in order to activate
the automatic joint custody provision. Shortly thereafter,
Father filed a Motion for Relief From Judgment pursuant to rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the
joint custody provision impermissibly allowed custody to be
prospectively changed based upon a future triggering event. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) (6) (allowing courts to relieve parties from
orders based on any reason justifying the requested relief, other
than the reasons contained elsewhere in rule 60(b)). The trial
court granted Father's motion, stating that the "change of
custody requires notice and a hearing and cannot occur
automatically upon a specified event." The trial court's order
also maintained Father's custody of Son and amended the original
Divorce Decree, Conclusions of Law[,] and Findings of Fact to
reflect the order.2 Mother did not appeal this order.
f3
Mother then petitioned to modify the custody award,
asserting that there had been a substantial and material change
in circumstances because (1) she now resided in the Salt Lake
Valley, in the same neighborhood as Father and Son; (2) she had
relocated in reliance on the now-invalidated joint custody
provision, the absence of which makes custody uncertain; and
(3) Son's best interests require stability in his custodial
arrangement, including a stable relationship with Mother. In
response, Father filed a motion to bifurcate the custody
modification hearing into two separate hearings: one to address
whether a substantial and material change in circumstances had
occurred and, if so, a second hearing to determine whether, based
on the changed circumstances, custody modification was in Son's
best interests. The trial court granted Father's unopposed
motion to bifurcate "[t] o the extent that [Father] f s [motion]
merely reaffirms the [statutory] requirement" that the court
Eirst determine whether there has been a substantial and material
1

Son requires special services due to physical and learning
disabilities, some of which stem from a degenerative nerve
disorder.
2

Father's rule 60(b) motion was considered by a different
judge than the judge who entered the divorce decree. A third
judge, Judge Denise P. Lindberg, presided over Mother's petition
to modify.
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change in circumstances before reaching the best interests
determination. The trial court further clarified that it did not
agree with Father "if [his] intent is to have the Court hold
separate trials on the bifurcated issues." The trial court
accordingly informed the parties that "the (material change issue
[will be] presented first, but the parties should be prepared to
immediately proceed to presentation of the substantive case if
the court determines the threshold issue has been satisfied."
f4
At trial on Mother's petition to modify custody, the court
received testimony from several witnesses, including Dr. Valerie
Hale — the court-appointed custody evaluatotf--and various
officials from Son's school. At the beginning of the second
trial day, the court made a "preliminary" finding that
substantial and material changes had occurred since entry of the
Divorce Decree but reserved making a final determination on the
issue until the remainder of the evidence had been presented and
Father had been afforded a full opportunity to rebut Mother's
evidence. The trial court ultimately affirmed this preliminary
finding, stating that the striking of the loint custody
provision, among other factors, constituted a substantial and
material change in circumstances not contemplated in the Divorce
Decree. The trial court then made a best interests
determination, concluding that, consistent with Dr. Hale's
testimony and the recommendations of Dr. H&le and the Guardian Ad
Litem (GAL), Mother's custody of Son was in Son's best interest.
The trial court thus granted Mother's petition to modify custody
and granted Mother sole legal and physical custody of Son.
15
The trial court also addressed the is&ue of child support
after requesting and receiving supplemental briefing on that
issue. According to the Divorce Decree, the social security
disability benefits to which Son is entitled (the SSDI benefits)
were credited against the child support obligations of both
parents.3 Otherwise, the Divorce Decree did not address child
support. Mother argued that the original child support provision
was not legally correct because the SSDI benefits should only
have been credited toward her support obligation, not toward
Father's, because they were based on her disability. In
addition, Mother argued that child support modification was
necessary due to the recent custody modification. Father, on the
other hand, argued that crediting the SSDI benefits to both
parents was not error because it was not specifically prohibited
by either statutory or case law, and that Mother is not entitled
to support modification because she failed to request it in her
petition to modify. The trial court agreed with Mother,
3

The SSDI benefits to which Son is entitled stem entirely
from Mother's disability.
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determining that the original decree improperly credited the SSDI
benefits against Father!s support obligation, and that, although
Mother did not explicitly request support modification in her
petition, she was entitled to child support because it
necessarily flowed from the custody modification. See id.
R. 54(c)(1) (providing that, with exceptions not applicable to
the present case, "every final judgment shall grant the relief to
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings")
Child support was modified according to calculations Mother
submitted, based on the table contained in subsection (2) of Utah
Code section 78B-12-301. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-301(2)
(2 008). Father now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1J6
Father first argues that the trial court's failure to
"completely" bifurcate the change in circumstances issue from the
best interests issue constitutes reversible error. Whether the
trial court was required to hold separate hearings on these two
issues involves the interpretation of Utah case law. "Pure
questions of law . . . are reviewed for correctness." Huish v.
Munro, 2008 UT App 283, % 19, 191 P.3d 1242.
117
Father next argues that the trial court erred in determining
that there had been a substantial and material change in
circumstances sufficient to justify custody modification. " ! The
determination of the trial court that there [has or has not] been
a substantial change of circumstances . . . is presumed valid,
and we review the ruling under an abuse of discretion standard.1"
Young v. Young, 2009 UT App 3, H 4, 201 P.3d 301 (quoting
Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, K 10, 997 P.2d 903
(alterations in original)).
18
Father also argues that the trial court incorrectly
concluded that Son's best interests would be served by modifying
custody to grant Mother sole legal and physical custody, subject
to Father's exercise of liberal parent time. "It is well
established that an appellate court will decline to consider an
argument that a party has failed to adequately brief." Valcarce
v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 313 (Utah 1998).
1(9
Finally, Father argues that, in the event the trial court' s
custody modification is upheld, the trial court erred in
modifying child support because Mother did not request, nor was
she entitled to, such relief. We review the trial court's legal
determinations regarding Mother's entitlement to child support
modification for correctness. See Wall v. Wall, 2007 UT App 61,
1 7, 157 P.3d 341, cert, denied, 168 P.3d 819 (Utah 2007). As
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for the amount of the modified child support, " [w] e will not
upset the trial court ! s apportionment of financial
responsibilities in the absence of manifest injustice or inequity
Maughan v. Maughan,
that indicates a clear abuse of discretion.
770 P-2d 156, 161 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
ANALYSIS
I. Custody Modificatiqn
flO Father's appeal alleges various proce iural and legal errors
committed by the trial court during the cu stody modification
proceedings. In particular, Father challe: iges the trial court's
decision not to completely bifurcate heari jgs regarding the
issues of changed circumstances and best i: iterests, arguing that
the trial court improperly allowed best inJ erests evidence to be
presented prior to a determination of chan< led circumstances,
result of this
Father contends that he was prejudiced as
procedural error. Relatedly, Father argue that the trial court
erred in concluding that a substantial and material change in
circumstances had indeed occurred. Final1;K Father claims that
the trial court erred in determining that ,ion's interests would
best be served with Mother as his primary tustodian. We address
each of these issues separately below.
A.

Complete Bifurcation

Ull Father reiterates on appeal an argume: Lt he espoused before
the trial court; namely, that Utah case la^ requires complete
separation of the changed circumstances am best interests
determinations, effectively preventing a p. irty seeking custody
modification from presenting any evidence relevant to best
interests until it has been judicially det< irmined " that a legally
sufficient change in circumstances has tak< m place. In other
words, Father asks us to presume prejudice where the changed
circumstances and best interests issues an i not decided in
completely separate hearings and evidence < m both issues is not
strictly segregated.
Hl2 We agree with Father that Utah case law requires a
determination that circumstances have mate jrially and
substantially changed before proceeding to a determination of
which parenting arrangement is in the chi Id 1 s best interests.
See Hogqe v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah |l 9 8 2) (establishing
two-prong analytical framework for custody] modification); see
also Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 ([Utah 1984) (applying
Hogge and emphasizing that changes must bej material, i.e., "the
kind of circumstances on which an earlier custody decision was
based") . However, we, like the trial courtt disagree with Father
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that evidence or testimony relevant to both a material change in
circumstances and the child 1 s best interests must somehow be
presented separately.
1113 Although the analytical framework requiring bifurcation of
these determinations is clear, fl[t]his framework says nothing
. . . about how a trial court must receive evidence." Huish v.
Munro, 2008 UT App 283, % 17, 191 P.3d 1242. Cases decided
subsequent to the establishment of this framework have recognized
that trial courts have discretion to f,deci[de] to merge the best
interests of the child into the changed circumstances test
. . .[,3 particularly . . . when 'the initial custody award is
premised on a temporary condition, a choice between marginal
custody arrangements, . . . or similar exceptional criteria.1"
Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Maugham, 770 P.2d at 160). Moreover, in the present case, as is
quite frequently the situation, "the evidence supporting changed
circumstances is . . . the same evidence that is used to
establish the best interests of the child," Moody v. Moody, 715
P.2d 507, 511 (Utah 1985) (Daniels, Dist. J., concurring). And a
trial court is granted "wide discretion in controlling the mode
and order of the presentation of evidence," Huish, 2008 UT App
283, f 18 (citing Utah R. Evid. 611(a) and Paulos v. Covenant
Transp., Inc., 2004 UT App 35, \ 20, 86 P.3d 752), "provided it
ke[eps] its analysis appropriately bifurcated," id. Stated more
succinctly, "it is the bifurcation of the analysis--not the
literal bifurcation of the proceedings--that matters." Id.
\14
Much of the evidence presented at the modification
proceeding addressed Mother's relocation to the Salt Lake Valley,
Son ! s decreased sociability and his increasing behavioral and
educational needs, Fatherfs failure to make various parental
adjustments contemplated in the Divorce Decree, and Father's
inability and unwillingness to co-parent with Mother. We do not
agree with Father that this evidence should have been presented
in a separate hearing addressing sequentially the issues of
change in circumstances and Son's best interests. In fact, the
duplicative and overlapping nature of this evidence lends support
to the trial court's decision to hear all the evidence together,
so as to not waste resources of the court, the parties, or the
witnesses. The trial court was also mindful of the unusual
status of this case, resulting from the earlier striking of the
joint custody provision after Mother's relocation in reliance
thereon, Son's rapidly worsening disabilities, and the Divorce
Decree's clear preference that Mother be a part of Son's life to
the extent possible. Furthermore, Father has presented us with
no evidence showing that the trial court conflated its analysis
of the changed circumstances and best interests issues. Because
the trial court bifurcated its analysis of these issues, and
given the unusual circumstances of the case, the overlapping
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nature of the evidence presented, and the t^rial court's inherent
discretion to control the presentation of dvidence, we see no
error in the trial court's failure to completely bifurcate the
hearings. See id. 1 19.
B.

Substantial and Material Change in Circumstances

fl5 Father also argues that the trial courtt erred in determining
that a substantial and material change in circumstances had
occurred. Mother categorizes this determination as factual in
nature and argues that Father has failed tq marshal the evidence
required to properly challenge this factual finding. Father
responds, clarifying that his challenge is not directed toward
the trial court!s factual findings but instead is aimed at
whether the trial court's "findings of fact! themselves are
insufficient as a matter of law to support the legal conclusion
that there has been a material and substantial change of
circumstances." Because Father characterizes this determination
as a legal one, he urges us to apply a correctness standard of
review. However, Utah law makes clear that a determination of
whether substantial and material changes have occurred is a factintensive legal determination that is presumed valid and is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Young v. Young, 2009 UT
App 3, 1 4, 201 P.3d 301. Also, in making jsuch a determination,
trial courts must be mindful of two guiding principles: (1) the
inquiry must "ordinarily . . . focus exclusively on the parenting
ability of the custodial parent and the functioning of the
established custodial relationship," Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d
624, 626 (Utah 1987) ; and (2) the changed dircumstances allegedly
justifying the modification must be material, that is, they must
"be the kind of•circumstances on which [the] earlier custody
decision was based," Becker, 694 P.2d at 610. Ultimately, the
party seeking modification bears the burder| of demonstrating a
substantial change in circumstances, See Walton, 814 P.2d at
621.

i

Hl6 In determining that a qualifying change in circumstances had
occurred, the trial court made the following findings:
[T] he [original custody] decfision was
based on the fact that, at the time, [Mother]
was residing and working in Colorado and
[Son] was doing well in a stable and
supportive environment under [Father's] care.
Relying on the [joint custody provision]
of the Divorce Decree, . . . [Mother]
informed her employer she would not be
renewing her teaching contract, ^.nd completed
her relocation to Salt Lake (and to [Son's]
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neighborhood) within six to eight weeks
following entry of the Decree.
The parties demonstrated their
understanding of [the] Decree by the fact
that they began implementing the [joint]
custody provision[] of the Divorce Decree
even as they sought to change it.
When [it was] determined that the
automatic change [detailed in the joint]
custody provision [] of the Divorce Decree
violated Utah law, the parties were faced
with a new legal interpretation of the Decree
that neither side could have foreseen at the
time it was entered.
Additionally, [the original judge]
clearly anticipated that [Father] f s parenting
skills would continue to develop, and that he
would adopt less harsh discipline methods
toward[] [Son] . In fact, however, [Father]
has continued to rely excessively on corporal
punishment . . . .

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered,
[the original judge] also expected that [Son]
would continue to enjoy stability and success
in [Father]!s care. Contrary to [the
original judge]1s expectations, the evidence
presented at trial leads the Court to find
that [Son] has not been thriving in
[Father] fs care. . . . [C]redible testimony
from Dr. Valerie Hale, the Court-appointed
evaluator, leads the Court to find that since
[the original judge] entered his findings,
[Son]*s level of social, educational, and
psychological functioning has deteriorated.
Indeed, at various times since the Decree
[was] entered, [Son] has displayed increased
anxiety levels and seriously dysfunctional
ideation and behaviors.[]
[The original judge found] "that if
either [Father] or [Mother] do not foster a
loving relationship for [Son] by both parents
for the benefit of [Son], by . . . limiting
access to the child unreasonably . . . then
. . . th[at] parent does not have the best
interest of [Son] at heart and the Court
would take that into account in the future,
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if any petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce comes before the Court."
Testimony from Dr. Valerie Hale . . .
indicates that [Father] has attempted to
marginalize [Mother] fs relationship with
[Son] by taking actions such as unplugging
the phone, . . . restricting oth^r contacts
between [Son] and [Mother] . . . [and]
objecti[ng] to having [Mother] participate in
[Son's mandatory special needs meetings at
school].
The trial court also took note of the fact that the judge who
entered the Divorce Decree took steps to ensure that both parents
could be a part of Son's life to the fullest extent possible;
most notable among these steps was the inclusion of the nowinvalidated joint custody provision.
Kl7 In sum, the trial court found that since entry of the
Divorce Decree, Mother had relocated to Son's neighborhood, the
joint custody provision had been invalidated, Father's parenting
skills had not improved, Son's educational and social performance
had deteriorated, and Father had actively attempted to exclude
Mother from Son's life. Implicit in the trial court's findings
is the fact that the current custody arrangement had proven
unworkable, and this by itself is sufficient to meet the changed
circumstances threshold. See Huish, 2008 UJT App 283, H 13.
Moreover, none of these facts was anticipated in the Divorce
Decree, they "focus [almost] exclusively on the parenting ability
of the custodial parent and the functioning of the established
custodial relationship," see Kramer, 738 P|2d at 626, and they
address "the kind of circumstances on which [the] earlier custody
decision was based," see Becker, 694 P.2d at 610. Thus, in light
of the trial court's detailed factual findings and the unusual
legal and factual changes in this case, we see no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's determination that there had been
a substantial and material change in circumstances since entry of
the Divorce Decree.
C.

Son's Best Interests

%18 Father also cursorily argues that the trial court erred in
determining that custody modification was in Son's best
interests. However, "[i]t is well established that an appellate
court will decline to consider an argument that a party has
failed to adequately brief." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 313 (Utah 1998) . An argument is inadequately briefed if it
"wholly lacks legal analysis and authority to support [it]."
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) . The entirety of
Father's argument regarding Son's best interests is one paragraph
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long, provides no citation to legal authority or the record, and
contains only conclusory statements such as lf [Father] cared for
[Son] with utmost care." Because Father's best interests
argument is inadequately briefed, we decline to address it
further.4
II. Child Support Modification
ifl9 Father contends that the trial court's modification of child
support following the order of custody modification was legally
inappropriate because Mother neither asked for, nor was she
entitled to, such relief. Father further alleges that the trial
court applied the wrong child support guidelines in determining
the amount of child support. We address each of these arguments
in turn.
A.

Modification of Child Support Is Legally Appropriate

i|20 Father argues first that Mother's failure to request support
modification in her petition to modify custody is fatal to the
trial court's award. The trial court recognized Mother's failure
to request support modification in her petition but nevertheless
determined that rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, combined with a trial court's inherent discretion in
domestic cases, allows the modification in this case. We agree.
1[21 Rule 54(c) (1) states, in pertinent part, that "every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor
it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded
such relief in his pleadings." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(c) (1). This
rule also allows trial courts discretion, in the interest of
justice, to "determine the ultimate rights of the parties . . .
as between . . . themselves." Id. The Utah Code further
buttresses the trial court's child support decision, stating that
" [obligations ordered for child support . . . are for the use
and benefit of the child and shall follow the child." Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-12-108(1) (2008) (emphasis added). Rule 54(c)(1) and
the Utah Code, when considered together, allow the trial court
discretion to modify the parties' child support obligations
despite Mother's failure to request such relief in her petition.
1(22 Father also contends that even if the trial court had the
discretion to modify child support, it was not appropriate
because the original order in the Divorce Decree was adequate.
We disagree. Utah Code section 78B-12-203(8)(b) provides that
4

We nevertheless observe that there was sufficient evidence
that Son's best interests would be served by the custody
modification.
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"Social Security benefits received by a chilld due to the earnings
of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent upon
whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount against
the potential obligation of that parent." Id. § 78B-12-203(8)(b)
(emphasis added). When entering the Divorde Decree, the trial
court credited the SSDI benefits against both parentsf support
obligations, despite the fact that the benefits stem entirely
from Mother's disability.
f23 Although Father acknowledges that the SSDI benefits should
be credited toward Mother ! s support obligation, he argues that
nothing in the language of section 78B-12-203 (8) precludes the
trial court from crediting the SSDI benefits toward his support
obligation as well. Again, we disagree. The plain language of
section 78B-12-203 (8) clearly states that quch benefits are to be
credited against the support obligation of "the parent upon whose
earning record it is based." Id. This language does not give
trial courts discretion to alter this credit. See id.; cf.
Meenderink v. Meenderink, 2006 UT App 348, 1 8, 144 P.3d 219
(determining that the trial court had no discretion to decide
whether or how to apply the credit for social security disability
benefits, stating simply that the predecessor to section 78B-12203(8) "mandates full crediting of the SSDI payments toward [the
earning parent's] child support obligation 1 ). Accordingly, we
conclude that the trial court did not err in modifying child
support to provide Mother and Son the relief to which they are
entitled and to correct the error in the original child support
award.5
B.

The Amount of Modified Child Support is Incorrect

1124 Father asserts that even if support mcpdification is
appropriate, the amount of the support awarded is incorrect
because the trial court applied the wrong statutory child support
guidelines. Section 78B-12-301 of the Utah Code contains two
tables to be used for establishing or modifying child support
orders. tSee Ut:ah 'Code Ann. § 78B-12-301. Which table to be used
is determined by the date of the establishment or modification of
the support order. The table contained in ^tibsecti^fr
to any "child support order . . . established or modified on or
before ^December 31, 2007f" while the table in subsection (2) is
5

Relatedly, Father briefly argues that the law of the case
doctrine prevents the trial court from modifying the original
We disagree,
support order even if it was entered in error
because the law of the case doctrine does hot go so far as to
"prohibit a judge from catching a mistake p.nd fixing it. "
Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 13 06, 1311 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omittbd)
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to be used--with several exceptions not relevant to our analysis-to modify all "support order [s] entered for the first time on or
after January 1, 2008." Id^ § 78B-12-301 (1)-(2) .
i|25 Although Father contends that the Divorce Decree contained
an order relating to child support, Mother argues that the decree
"did not include a child support order, as contemplated by the
[Utah Code.]" Mother further asserts that the Divorce Decree
failed to include required findings for a child support order and
determined that the SSDI benefits were awarded in lieu of a child
support order. Mother therefore urged the trial court to modify
support based upon the table in subsection (2). The trial court
agreed with Mother and applied the table in subsection (2)
because it concluded that the Divorce Decree did not contain a
child support order. To determine the correctness of this
conclusion, we must decide whether *tKe^2005" Divorce Decree^
includes a child support order: If it does, then the table-dn"
subsection (1) should have been applied:; if it does not, then the
trial court correctly applied the table in subsection (2). See
id.
f26 In connection with granting custody of Son to Father, the
Divorce Decree stated that "it is reasonable to allow [the SSDI]
benefits to serve as child support and it is reasonable to not
require child support to be paid by [Mother] ." £The Divorce Decree thus concluded that the SSDI benefits "should be used to*^
satisfy both parties1 child support obligations, with the parties
having no further child support claim against or obligation to
each other." Despite Mother's arguments to the contrary, this
order clearly addressed child support and is therefore properly
considered a child support order. Because the Divorce Decree
contained a child support order and was entered "before December
31, 2007," the trial court erred in applying the table in
subsection (2) to determine the modified child support amount.
See id. Accordingly,~we reverse and remand for a determination^
of the amount Father must pay under the table contained in **
subsection (1-) .
CONCLUSION
H27 We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to
hold separate hearings on the issues of changed circumstances and
best interests. We also see no abuse of discretion in the trial
courtf s determination that substantial and material changes had
occurred since entry of the Divorce Decree. And because Father
has inadequately briefed his challenge to the trial court's best
interests determination, we affirm that determination as well.
Thus, there was no error in the trial court's decision to modify
custody. Finally, we conclude that although it was proper for

90080618-CA
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the trial court to modify child support, theltrial court applied
the wrong guidelines in determining the amount thereof. We
therefore affirm the trial court's decision in all respects
except for its determination of the amount op modified child
support, which determination we reverse and remand so that the
court may recalculate child support accordii to the correct
child support guidelines.

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

^2 8

^^

WE CONCUR:

William AT Thorne Jr., Judge

i r o l y n t / B . McHugh,
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COUNTY
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,
'
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

-vsROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,

Case No. 034903528
Judge Denise P. Lindberg
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

Respondent

f1

On October 2 and 3,2007, the Court held a bench trial on Respondent's Petition to Modify

the Divorce Decree entered by the Court on February 28,2005. Petitioner Douglas Doyle (Doug)
was preseijttandrepresented by counsel Steven ChnstensenandBretinanMoss. Respondent Robin
Doyle (Robin) was present and represented by counsel Suzanne JVLarelius. The parties' mii^or
child, Hyrum Doyle (Hyrum) did not participate in the trial, but was represented by private
Guardian ad Litem (GAL) Kim Luhn. In advance of trial Petitioner moved the Court to bifurcate
the trial into separate hearings-the first one to address whether t|he Petition to Modify met the
standard of a substantial and material change in circumstances, 9nd the second one to consider
Hyrum's best interests.
f2

The Court granted Petitioner's motion in part and denied iiJ in part The Court agreed with

Petitioner that it was required by law to address first whether the threshold standard for granting
a modification had been met, and only if that threshold standard] was satisfied would the Court
proceed to determine whether the requested custody modification] was in Hyrum's best interests.

However, the Court disagreed with Petitioner on the need for separate hearings. The Court
concluded that judicial economy was best served by having all the evidence presented during the
two (sequential) days set aside for trial,1 although the two issues would be considered separately
and in the order dictated by law.2 Additionally, at the final pretrial conference, and again at the
beginning of trial, the Court discussed with the parties the amount of tune that would be available
to each side to present its case.3 Neither side lodged timely objections to the trial time allocation.

*By consolidating trial time witnesses only have to be called once to appear and testify,
sparing them the possibility of having their regular schedules twice disrupted and saving the
parties additional witness fees. See, e.g, Moody v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 511 (Utah
1985)(Daniels, District Judge (concurring). By consolidating the presentation of the evidence
the Court is also better able to remember all the relevant testimony without having to spend
additional preparation time between separate hearings to review notes and refresh its recollection
of the facts.
2

At a pretrial hearing the Court had addressed various motions in Limine brought by
Petitioner. One~of the motions sought to exclude Dr. Hale's custody evaluation report on the
basis that the information in the report went to the issue of "best interests" and should not be
considered at the initial phase of the custody modification trial. The Court denied the motion
based on its prior ruling on the bifurcation issue. Petitioner then moved to continue the trial,
which motion the Court also denied. The Court indicated it would address specific objections to
the evidence as they arose.
3

The Court informed counsel that trial wpuld begin at 9:00 a.m. each day, there would be
a mid-morning and mid-afternoon break (each of which would be approximately 15 minutes in
duration), a lunch break of approximately one hour, and the Court would recess each day
between 4 and 4:30 p JGQ. in order to handle other matters. Based on those break and recess
periods, each side would have approximately five (5) hours of time to present their case. The
GAL was allocated one (1) hour of trial time). Throughout the trial the Court kept the parties
informed as to the amount of time remaining to them. Although the Court extended the time
allotted to counsel by shortening or eliminating the normal mid-morning and mid-afternoon
breaks and by limiting the lunch periods significantly, Petitioner's counsel objected that they had
been denied the opportunity to present all the evidence they desired. The Court rejects counsels'
claim. Having been given fair warning of the tune limitations, Petitioner3 counsel made tactical
decisions about how they wished to present their case and where they would spend then: time.
Moreover, by announcing its determination on the threshold issue at the beginning of the second
2

%3

After considering the evidence adduced during the first dayj the Court opened the second

day of trial by stating the reasons why it was satisfied that the threshold showing of a substantial
and material change in circumstances had been met. Petitioner noted his obj ection on the grounds
that he had not had adequate opportunity to challenge Respondent^ case. Inresponse the Court
stated it would treat its judgment on this issue as preliminary," and|Petitioner was fee to present
whatever other evidence he wished the Court to consider.4
^4

At the conclusion of the second day of trial the Court reaffirined its previously announced

determination that a substantial and material change of circumstances had indeed occurred which
was not anticipated at the time the Decree was entered. The Court also announced itsfindingsand
judgment on the issue of what custodial arrangement would best serve Hyrum's interests. At the
Court's request Respondent's counsel prepared proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree of Modification, and forwarded the same to opposing counsel. Petitioner lodged
numerous obj ections which the Court has considered. After reviewihg the trial record, the exhibits
and testimony adduced at trial, and the arguments and objectiqns lof counsel, the Court is fully •
advised. As more fully set forth below, the Court enters its Finding? of Fact, Conclusions of Law,

day, the Court hoped to expedite matters and to See counsel to focijis on the more critical issue of
the child's best interest. To the extent that counsel failed to heed the Court's warnings, misallocated time and, as a result, did not cover all the issues they intended to cover, responsibility
for those choices lies with them rather than with the Court.
4

After ruling on the existence of substantial, material change of circumstances,
Petitioner's counsel made an oral motion for mistrial. The Court dpnied the motion. Counsel for
Petitioner then made an oral motion to stay the ruling of the Court;! that motion was also denied.
The Court directed the parties to continue their evidentiary presentation to prove the elements
required for the custody modification and defense. The trial continued thereafter on the issue of
best interests and Petitioner's defense to the Petition.
3

and Decree. Before doing so, however, the Court digresses briefly to explain the background and
unusual posture of this qase
BACKGROUND
%5

These parties were married in September 1995. They separated in June 2003.

Following a divorce trial held December 13 and 14,2004, Judge Frank Noel entered Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce on February 28,2005.
^[6

The parties3 son, Hyrum, was born July 29,1996. He suffers ftom a peripheral nerve

disorder known as "Charcot Marie Tooth Syndrome," which cause patients slowly to lose
normal use of their extremities due to muscle and nerve degeneration. Hyrum has also
exhibited other learning and speech delays, and began receiving special education services
through the Salt Lake School District in preschool, at age 3.
f7

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered Robin was living in Colorado; Hyrum was

in Salt Lake in the custody of his father. In his Findings of Fact accompanyinglhe Divorce
Decree Judge Noel noted that Doug's rigid and harsh methods with respect to both Robin and
Hyrum had resulted in "some abuse" to both With respect to Robin, Judge Noel noted Doug
had sought to exercise control over Robin, her activities and relationships. With respect to
Hyrum, Judge Noel expressly referenced one incident prior to May 2003 "in which Doug
slapped Hyrum and in which Doug verbally abused Hyrum." Findings of Fact, %7,
Nevertheless, Judge Noel concluded that since the time of that incident Doug had "grown" and
had shown a "sincere desire to improve and be a good father." Id at <f 8, Judge Noel further
found that Doug and Hyrum shared a loving relationship, that Hyrum had "thrived" in his
father's care, and was "happy and contented in Doug's custody " Id at %l 1. Judge Noel stated4
4

"The evidence further suggests that [Hyrum] has established a netkork of friends and
relationships in which hie is happy, and that he is actively involved in scouting and church
activities." Based on these findings Judge Noel determined thatDOug should be awarded sole
legal and physical custody of Hynaru But, Judge Noel's Decree also provided that "[i]n the
event [Robin] relocates to the Salt Lake Valley, the parties will have joint legal and physical
custody and shall share time equally on alternating weeks and on holidays as per standard
schedule.'5 Decree, at %2.
\%

It is evident from Judge Noel's findings of fact that his principal reason for awarding

custody as he did was so as not to disrupt an environment in which Hyrum was happy and
thriving. It is also apparent that Judge Noel believed Robin and Ljoug were equally capable of
meeting Hyrum's needs, as evidenced by the fact that the Decree anticipated the two would
share joint legal and physical custody of Hyrum if Robin returned Ito Salt Lake County.
f9

Given the rationale adopted by Judge Noel in his Findings I of Fact and Conclusions of

Law in support of the Divorce Decree, and the anticipated opportunity to share custody of
Hyrum if she returned to Utah, Robin gave up her job in Denver, where she was teaching
science as an adjunct faculty member at Front Range Community ICollege. Robin relocated to
Salt Lake City on May 9,2005, moving to an apartment across th0 street from Hyrum's
elementary school (Woodrow Wilson Elementary) where he was attending the 4th grade.
1fl0

Shortly thereafter, on May 27,2005, Robin filed a Motion for a New Trial. Doug had

earlier filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. In the interim, Judge Noel had retired from
the Court and his caseload had been assigned to Judge Deno Himbnas. On August 12,2005,
Judge Himonas held a hearing on the parties' respective motions,, At the conclusion of the
5

hearing Judge Himonas denied Robin's motion and granted Doug's motion. An Order
reflecting the Court's ruling was entered January 11,2006.
111

Judge Himonas' ruling was based on his finding that the provisions in the Divorce

Decree for change of custody "require[d] notice and a hearing and "[could not] occur
automatically upon a specified event" Judge Himonas' Order explained that the effect of the
ruling meant that Doug would retain sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum, and that "any
request to modify the custody award [would have to be] made by Petition to Modify the
Divorce Decree.3' Based on the Court's ruling and Order, Robin filed a Verified Petition for
Modification on October 113 2005.
^[12

Upon Robin's return to Salt Lake the parties began sharing equal parent time; Robin

later filed a Motion for Temporary Orders to clarify the parent time and custody status. That
Motion was heard by the Commissioner on November 16,2005. An Order reflecting the
recommendations of the Commissioner was signed by the Court on January 23,2006. Pursuant
to the Commissioner's recommendation the Court denied the request to change custody, but
ordered that the parties continue implementing the shared parenting arrangement without
labeling it joint custody. Specifically, the Court ordered that the parties "share equal time with
the minor child on a seven day rotating basis." The Commissioner determined that the parent
time award in the Divorce Decree was stated separately from the custody terms that Judge
Himonas' Order had invalidated. Therefore, the Commissioner recommended that the time
sharing provisions be enforced, as consistent with Judge Noel's Decree.
1fl3

The Court's Order of January 233 2006 also provided that there should be no change to

Hyrum's school enrollment unless the parties mutually agreed to the change.
6

Tfl4

On or about March 2006, Robin requested that the Court carder a custody evaluation,

and proposed to the .Court the names of two possible evaluators. The Court agreed that a
custody evaluation was indicated and appointed Valerie Hale, Ph.P. to perform it. The Court
ordered that the parties jointly share the expense of the evaluationi In order to have the
evaluation commence as quickly as possible, the Court's order provided that Robin could pay
Dr. Hale's entire initial retainer, and that'Doug would reimburse Robin for his obligation of
one half of the retainer; Doug was orderedto reimburse Robiii at fie rate of $100.00 per month.
If 15

Robin receives disability payments based on her total blindness. As a result of Robin5 s

disability, the Social Security Administration also pays a dependent payment in the amount of
$614 per month.. Paragraph 6 of the Divorce Decree provided that the benefit received oil
Hyrum's behalf would be allocated in lieu of other child support. J At Paragraph 7 of the
Decree, the Court awarded Hyrum's entire dependent payment/to'Doug as long as he had sole
custody. In the event that Robin relocated to Salt Lake County,, the Decree further ordered that
Robin would become the payee on the dependent payment, and that the amounts received be
equally divided between Doug and Robin.
116

The unusual procedural posture of this ease, involving, as lit does, changed factual

circumstances as well as a changed legal interpretation .of how regarding certain provisions of
the Divorce Decree can be effectuated, creates the context in whickh the Court makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings Regarding Substantial and Material Changes in Circumstances Not Anticipated at
Time Decree Entered.

f 17

During the divorce trial before Judge Noel, Doug had challenged Robin's fitness to care

for Hyrum on the basis of some serious mental health crises Robin had experienced for a time.5
Nevertheless, this Court is persuaded that Judge Noel's decision to award Petitioner legal
custody was not based on Robin's alleged unfitness. Rather, the Court's decision was based on
the fact that, at the time, Robin was residing and working in Colorado and Hyrum was doing
well in a stable and supportive environment under his father' care. By ruling that upon Robin's
relocation to Salt Lake County she and Doug would exercise joint legal and physical custody of
Hyrum, Judge Noel implicitly rejected the substance of Doug's claims, concluding instead that
both were "fit and proper parents."
"[18

Relying on the terms of the Divorce Decree that provided for automatic change of

custody if she moved back to Salt Lake, Robin informed her employer she would not be
renewing her teaching contract, and completed her relocation to Salt Lake (and to Hyrum's
neighborhood) within six to eight weeks following entry of the Decree
f 19

The parties demonstrated their understanding of Judge Noel's Decree by the fact that

they began implementing the shared custody provisions of the Divorce Decree even as they
sought to change it.
f20

When Judge Himonas determined that the automatic change of custody provisions of

the Divorce Decree violated Utah law, the parties were faced with a new legal interpretation of
the Decree that neither side could have foreseen at the time it was entered.

5

During the parties' marriage Robin experienced a serious episode of clinical depression
that required she be hospitalized for a period of time.
8

f21

Additionally, Judge Noel clearly anticipated that Doug's parenting skills would

continue to develop, and that he would adopt less harsh disciplinel methods towards Hyrum.
In .fact, however, Doug has continued to rely excessively on corporal punishment to the extent
that, based on Hyrum's reports, Dr. Gardner (Hyrum's pediatricia^i) felt compelled to make a
child abuse referral to DCFS.
f22

Although there was insufficient evidence presented to alloW the'Court to find that child

abuse in fact has occurred (and DCFS has apparently not .completed an investigation of the
referral) the very fact that Hyrum's pediatrician felt it necessary to make the referral suggests
that Doug has not adopted the more age-appropriate and less hars^i disciplinary methods that
Judge Noel expected him to implement6
|23

At the time the Divorce Decree was entered, Judge Noel al^b expected that Hyrum

•would continue to enjoy stability and;success in Doug's care. -Contrary to Judge Noel's
expectations, the evidence presented at trial leads the Court to find that Hyrum has not been
thriving in Doug's care. As more fully explained below, credible testimony from Dr. Valerie
Hale, the Court-appointed evaluator, leads the Court to find that sijace Judge Noel entered his
findings, Hyrum's level of social,-educational, and psychological functioning has deteriorated.

6

As referenced earlier, Judge Noel found that Doug had previously slapped and verbally
abused Hyrum, but the Court thought that Doug had "learned more appropriate conduct" and
"shown a sincere desire to change and to use appropriate [discipline] methods." See Judge Noel's
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, at | f 7,8.
9

Indeed, at various times since the Decree entered, Hyrum has displayed increased anxiety levels
and seriously dysfunctional ideation and behaviors.7
|24

At f 20 of his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Judge Noel stated as follows:
The Court finds that if either Doug or Robin do not foster a loving relationship
for the child by both parents for the benefit of the child, by either limiting access
to the child unreasonably . . . then the Court finds and is of the opinion that the
parent does not have the best interest of the child at heart and the Court would
take that into account in the future, if any petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce comes before the Court

f25

Testimony from Dr. Valerie Hale, the Court-appointed evaluator, indicates that Doug has

attempted to marginalize Robin's relationship with Hyrum by taking actions such as unplugging
the phone, or restricting other contacts between Hyrum and Robin.8 As explained below,
additional evidence of Doug's actions to marginalize Robin can be found in his objections to
having Robin participate in Hyrum's IEP, as reported by school personnel. It is also of great
concern to the Court that, in summarizing herfindings,Dr. Hale commented that "Doug
honestly fe[els] that nothing good [can] come to Hyrum from spending time with Robin." The

1

See} e g, note 8 infra. Dr. Hale also reported receiving crisis calls from Hyrum during
the course of her evaluation. Although the Court is not altogether clear on the extent to which
Hyrum may (or may not) be in crisis presently, the testimony from both Dr. Hale and Dr. Juan
Mejia (Doug's expert) amply support a finding that Hyrum continues to need psychological
counseling. One of the very few bright spots in the continuing battle between the parents is that
both parents now appear to be supporting Hyrum's involvement in counseling with Dr. Merrill
Kingston.
8

In particular, Dr. Hale expressed serious concerns about Doug's ability to manage
Hyrum as he entered his teenage years-a time when children's psychological task is to
differentiate themselves from their parents. To address these concerns Dr. Hale recommended
that Hyrum continue psychotherapy with Dr. Kingston, and that Doug also consider
psychotherapy with a qualified therapist to assist him in understanding the effect of his
interpersonal behaviors on others.
10

Court finds that such views and conduct are clearly contrary to Ju<frge Noel's expectation at the
time he made his initial custody determination. Therefore, they cill into question Judge Noel's
initial judgment that Doug would ultimately prove himself to be an effective and cooperative
parent. As suggested by Judge Noel at $20 of his Findings, parental efforts to exclude the other
parent would be an important consideration for the Court in entertaining a future petition xo
modify the Decree.
Findings Regarding Hvrum's Best Interests,
f26

At the trial, Dr. Hale testified at length from her custody evaluation report, which was

admitted as an exhibit at trial and is part of the case record. Dr. Hole's report carefully
examined the required Rule 4-903 considerations, and her finding^ were based on an extensive
data-collection effort that involved interviewing the parties, Hynun, and numerous collateral
sources, as well as examining nearly 300 documents. Based onh$r evaluation Dr. Hale
recommended that Robin be awarded sole legal and physical custody of Hyrum, and that, with
one modification, Doug be given "standard" parent-time in accord with the schedule at Utah
Code §30-3-35. The modification suggested by Dr. Hale was thatlHyrum's mid-week parenttime with Doug extend to include an overnight stay. The Court relies on, and largely adopts the
analysis and recommendations of Dr. Hale's report as one of the bases supporting the Court's
findings of fact that Hyrum's best interests will be served by modifying the custody arrangement
that has existed between the parties.
1J27

Based on the data she collected and analyzed, Dr. Hale concluded that Doug's attitudes

and actions continue to be overlyrigid,judgmental and moralistic!, and these patterns of thought
and action are unlikely to change much in the*future. According 1)O Dr. Hale, Doug tends to be
11

unduly critical of anyone-whether it be Hyrum, his teachers, or Robin-whose actions he deems
to fall below a certain standard of "appropriate" behavior. Dr. Hale reports that Doug has
considerable difficulty va accepting, or even considering, that others may legitimately hold
views that differ from his own. Based on other trial testimony and the Court's own
observations, the Court agrees with Dr. Hale's assessment,
^j28

In the course of conducting her custody evaluation Dr. Hale spoke with a number of

school personnel at Woodrow Wilson elementary school, where Hyrum attends. Specifically,
Dr. Hale had contact with (a) Hyrum's 4th and 5th grade teachers, (b) the schooFs social worker,
(c) the district's occupational therapist and speech language coordinator, (d) the school's
special education and resource teacher, (f) the school counselor, and (g) the school principal. A
number of these individuals also testified at trial. All expressed serious concerns about Hyrum's
circumstances and functioning.
*j[29

The school personnel' confirmed that in March 2006-and against the' school's

recommendation-Doug discontinued Hyrum's participation in special education and resource
classes; he has also twice attempted to move Hyrum to a different school 9 The school
9

At various points in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Judge Noel clearly
determined that Hyrum's best interests required that he be able to enjoy stability and
predictability in his school and neighborhood environment. By implication, Judge Noel found
that Woodrow Wilson Elementary provided the necessary environment to meet Hyrum's needs..
For example, at f7 of his Findings of Fact, Judge Noel conditions having Doug retain the
disability payments received on Hyrum's behalf "so long as he remains in his current
neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current school while Robin lives in Colorado." Moreover,
the change in custody anticipated by the Decree upon Robin's relocation to Salt Lake carried
with it the additional proviso that she secure a residence "where Hyrum can reasonably attend his
current school fiom her home . . . " Judge Noel then reiterates "while Doug remains in his cuuent
neighborhood and Hyrum attends his current school, the parties should equally share time with
Hyrum so that each parent has Hyrum in his [or] her home 26 weeks out of the year." Clearly,
12

personnel also confirmed that Hyrum continues to need academic support to remain on grade
level, and that he is not performing at grade level in science and language. The school personnel
also testified that Hyrum is socially isolated, and that Doug has disrupted the educational setting
by inappropriately confronting teachers and by threatening litigation For example, the school
counselor, Mrs Webster, testified that at the time of Hyrum's February 2005 IEP conference she
asked police to be "on standby" because of what she perceived to lie Doug's threats. She also
testified that in her interactions with Doug she always arranges to have a third-party present to
witness the interaction, due to her ongoing concerns in dealing with Doug.10
Tf30

In contrast, school personnel testified very positively regardkng Robin's interactions with

the school They indicated that Robin has volunteered at the school over a period of years, and
has a good relationship with the teachers and other school personnel. Robin is viewed as being
supportive of, and responsive to, Hyrum's needs, but has been limited in the past because of
Doug's actions to exclude her from the IEP process.11

this was a very important consideration for Judge Noel as he determined what was in Hyrum's
best interest.
10

At trial, Hyrum's school counselor (Ms. Webster), testified that Doug had complained
of a playground bullying incident m which he felt Hyrum had been victimized. Ms. Webster
investigated the incident at length, but Doug was very critical of her investigation and would not
accept her findings as valid. Additionally, Ms. Webster testified that Hyrum appeared very stiff
and uncomfortable in the presence of his father, but was very relaxpd with his mother,
n

School personnel testified that Doug had insisted it was inappropriate for the school to
involve Robin in planning Hyrum's IEP because he was the parent) with sole legal and physical
custody
13

•pi

Credible testimony from Hymm's school teachers and other school personnel establishes

that Doug has taken actions that isolate Hyrum and that are not supportive of his needs, such as
prohibiting Hyrum from participating in certain school enrichment programs, and removing him
from the special education resources for which he qualifies and from which he was previously
benefitting.
f32

Based on the totality of the testimony from Hyrum's school personnel, the Court finds

that Robin appears to have a better understanding of Hyrum's academic needs, and is better
able than Doug to support Hymm's needs in this area.
$33

Despite Robin's documented earlier history of severe depression, Dr, Hale found her to

be functioning very well presently. Dr. Hale further indicated that she saw no indication that
Robin's past mental health issues would be likely to recur. According to Dr, Hale,, "Robin is an
excellent parent who can empathize with Hyrum and anticipate his needs. She is also a vigorous
but appropriate advocate of action to enhance Hyrum's psychological and social development
Robin has demonstrated more consistent commitment to ensuring that Hyrum participates in
appropriate therapy. In contrast, the Court is very concerned that at one point Doug withdrew
Hyrum from therapy during a time when Hyrum was clearly experiencing great difficulties.
Moreover, it appears that Doug's actions were driven by his disagreements with Hyrum's thentherapist, without giving due consideration to Hyrum's needs at the time.12 While both parents

12

A therapist by the name of Laura Clark was seeing Hyrum in June 2005. At the time
Hyrum was presenting with a variety of '"tics," high anxiety, suicidal ideation, and violent
ideation. 'Ms. Clark provided therapy services for approximately 10 months, but Doug
discontinued the therapy with Ms. Clark after she wrote a letter (dated March 17, 2006) with
which Doug took issue. See Ex. 15.
14

appear to be supporting Hyrum's present involvement in psychological counseling, the Court
finds that Robin has demonstrated a more consistent track record than Doug in this regard
TJ34

Based on the testimony at trial, the Court finds that Robin i£ the parent better suited, by

way of character and temperament, to serve as the custodial parent Hie Court relies on the
testimony and report from Dr. Hale to find that Robin is more likely to foster an ongoing
relationship between Hyrum and the other parent than what Doug \yould do if the Court were to
make him the primary custodial parent. Illustrative of the testimony that supports the Court's
finding on this issue (and to which the Court gives considerable weight) is a comment by Hyrum
reported by Dr. Hale in the course of her testimony. According to Dr. Hale, Hyrum told her that
"mom helps [him] buy gifts for dad, but dad will not help [him] to buy gifts for mom." By
contrast, the Court is persuaded that if given the opportunity to do so, Doug will continue his
efforts to exclude Robin from Hyrum's life. As Dr. Hale noted in her testimony, "Doug
honestly feels that nothing good can come to Hyrum from having Hm spend time with Robin,"
Elsewhere in her testimony Dr. Hale stated: "Doug's idea of an ide&l situation [for Hyrum] is
that after Doug remarries his new wife would take over providing care for Hyrum after school."
The Court interprets Dr. Hale's testimony on this issue to mean that, in Doug's view, such an
eventuality would largely eliminate the need for Robin's involvemtot in Hyrum's daily care.
Tf35

In reporting the results of her evaluation Dr. Hale indicated I that Doug's rigidity in

behavior and attitude suggested a diagnosis of Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder
(OCPD). In response, Doug presented lengthy testimony from his expert, Dr. Mejia, to
challenge Dr. Hale's ostensible "diagnosis." The Court need not reach the question whether Dr.
Hale's diagnostic label for Doug is accurate. Indeed, the Court believes it was unfortunate that
15

Dr, Hale used this diagnostic label because an unproductive amount of time was expended in
attempting to refute it. The Court's determination that Robin is the parent best able to meet
Hyrum's needs does not depend on the accuracy of Dr. Hale's "diagnosis." What is relevant to
the Court are the behaviors and attitudes exhibited by the parties in relation to each other, to
Hyrum, and to others who are significant in Hyrum's world., To the extent that testimony from
neutral witnesses converges on a point, -the Court gives great weight to the facts established
thereby, irrespective of labels that may or may not be applicable.
f36

Dr. Mejia also offered opinion testimony regarding Hyrum's desires and interests. Dr.

Mejja testified that his opinion was based on various meetings involving Doug and Hyrum,
Although Dr. Mejia testified he had seen Hyrum on*approxi*nately six occasions, he did not
clarify the length of each of those meetings, exactly .who was involved what transpired on those
occasions, or what his focus and purpose was in those interactions. Dr. Mejia also
acknowledged that he.had not met with Robin (either singly or with Hyrum), that he had not
conducted a custody evaluation per se, and that he had not made any collateral contacts. Thus,
Dr, Mejia3s own testimony establishes the limited bases for his- opinions- After considering the
opinion testimony offered by both Dr. Hale andJDr. Mejia, on the basis of the breadth of Dr.
Hale's worfc,13and her analysis of those findings in the context of the Rule 4-903 requirements;
the Court finds Dr. Hale's testimony and report to be more credible and carry greater validity.

13

As documented in her custody evaluation report, hi conducting her evaluation Dr. Hale
reviewed over 300 documents over a seven-month period, and met numerous times with the
parties, with Hyrum, and with other significant collateral contacts.16

f37

The Court has also considered, and given great weight to, the recommendations of the

GAL, who endorses Dr. Hale's recommendation that Robin be awarded legal and primary
physical custody of Hyrum, The GAL, however, has recommended a substantially more liberal
parent-time schedule than the one suggested by Dr. Hale. Specificklly, the GAL recommends
that Doug be awarded alternate weekends with Hyrum beginning Thursdays after school until
Monday morning On the alternate weeks when Doug does not haye weekend parent-time, his
Wednesday mid-week parent-tim,e extend overnight. The Court agrees with the GAL'S
recommendation and finds it to be an appropriate parent-time schedule for Doug and Hyrum. In
addition, Doug should be awarded standard holiday time schedule.. The Court further finds that
it is in Hyrum's best interest to enjoy two weeks of uninterrupted flarent-thne with each of his
parents- during the summer.
f 38

The GAL also recommended that the Court appoint a pareht coordinator to facilitate

resolution of issues that may arise between the parents in implementing parent-time
arrangements, and that the parties each bear one-half the cost associated with the services of a
parent coordinator. In announcing certain preliminary findings at the conclusion of trial the
Court agreed with the GAL and found that employing a parent coordinator would assist these
parties to work through difficulties that might arise in connection with parent-time issues or
other minor custody matters, thus serving Hyrum's best interest14

Subsequent to trial, however, the Court held a hearing onlMarch 19, 2008 at which the
parties, their counsel, and the GAL were present. At that hearing the GAL modified her earlier
recommendation that the parties engage the services of a parent coordinator. The GALinfoimed
the Court that since the time of trial, Dr. Kingston (Hyrum3 s therapist) had successfully assisted
the parties in resolving some disputes that had arisen. The GAL recommended that as long as
Dr. Kingston is comfortable assisting the parties in this manner, tae Court should defer requiring
17

P9

The testimony at trial was limited to the issues of (a) material change in circumstances

and (b) the best interest of the minor child Respondent's proposed findings of fact/conclusions
of law include certain financial matters not specifically addressed at trial. Specifically, some of
Respondent's proposed findings rely on the parties' verified financial declarations to establish
their respective monthly incomes. Others address the proper calculation of child support
(including Robin's SSDI benefits and/or the dependent disability benefits currently received on
Hyrum's behalf), claims for judgments for child support arrears, for allocation of Dr. Hale's
fees, and for attorney's fees. Petitioner has objected to those proposed findings on various
grounds'.13 The Court agrees with Petitioner that, at trial, no evidence nor argument was
presented directly dealing with financial issues. Accordingly, the Court will not address those
issues as part of the present Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, but will address them
through a separate Memorandum Decision aftex it has considered the parties' supplemental
briefing.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
f40

The Findings of Fact at flfl-25 of this decision amply support the Court's conclusion

that Robin has adequately established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a substantial and

the parties to secure the services of a parent coordinator. The Court agrees and finds that
implementation of a parent coordinator should be deferred until such time as the present
arrangement fails. At that point, either party or the GAL should be free to bring the matter back
to the Court's attention for action.
^Petitioner argues that either insufficient (or no) evidence was presented at trial upon
which Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on those issues could be based, and/or that the
Court did not state findings nor take those issues under advisement.
18

material change in circumstances occurred that was not anticipated at the time Judge Noel
entered the Divorce Decree, in this case. These changed circumstances are more than sufficient
to justify a custody modification in this case.
^[41

The Findings of Fact at f^| 26-38 of this decision amply support the Court's conclusion

that Hyrum's best interest will be best served by granting Robin sole legal and physical custody
of Hyrum, subject to Doug's exercise of liberal parent time as referenced supra at p 7 . In
reaching this conclusion the Court has expressly relied upon, and adopted, the recommendations
of the custody evaluator and of the GAL. To the extent the GAL's recommendations modify the
custody evaluator's recommendations, the Court concludes that the I GAL's modifications are
appropriate and should be implemented.
\A2

It is in Hyrum's best interest that the parties adopt a mechantism to assist them in

resolving the recurring disputes about his care that presently contribute to the contention
between them. For that reason the Court initially agreed with the GAL's recommendation that a
parent coordinator should be appointed Because it now appears that Hyrum's present therapist
has been successful in assisting the parties to deal with some of the?e issues informally, the
Court has determined that the appointment of a parent coordinator ctan be deferred. However, if
at some point Hyrum3 s therapist determines that he cannot (or should not) continue to mediate
informally whatever minor parent-time or other disputes may arise between the parties, then the
Court concludes that Hyrum's best interests will be best served by promptly retaining a parent
coordinator. If so, either party (or the GAL) can bring the matter td the Court's attention for
prompt action. Robin and Doug shall be equally liable for the expenses of a parent coordinator,

19

and will need to pay one-half of any retainer that may be required within thirty (30) days of a
hearing at which either the Court orders, or the Commissioner recommends, such action.
^[43

Although at the time of the trial the Court anticipated that its determination regarding

change in custody would be implemented reasonably promptly, delays occasioned by the need to
resolve objections to the Court's decision resulted in the parties continuing their shared custody
arrangement. At the hearing held March 19, 2008, the Court heard argument from the parties
and from the GAL. The GAL argued that Hyrum's best interests were not being served by
prolonging the period of shared custody, and urged the Court to enter promptly an Interim Order
of Modification so the custodial changes could be implemented prior to the conclusion of
Hyrum's Easter/Spring break. The Court was persuaded by the GAL's argument and that sameday entered the requested Interim Order. In issuing these Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, the Court hereby reaffirms its earlier conclusion that entry of the Interim Order was fair,
appropriate, and in Hyrum's best interest,
1(44

Respondent is directed to prepare an Order of Modification consistent with these

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

SO ORDERED BY THE COURT this J^_ day of

3EDEMSEPpS
District Court Judge
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Appendix D
Order of Modification
M y 23, 2008

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DOUGLAS PATRICK DOYLE,

:

ORDER OF MODIFICATION

Petitioner,

:

CASEI NO. 034903528

vs.

:

ROBIN ELAINE DOYLE,
Respondent.

s
:

The Court held a trial on respondent's Modification Petition on
October 2 and 3, 2007.

Petitioner was present in person and represented

by counsel Steve S. Christensen, Brennan H. Moss,

and Matthew B.

Anderson. The respondent was present in person and represented by counsel
Suzanne Marelius. The minor child was representee! by private guardian ad
litem, attorney Kim Luhn. The Cotirt heard testimony of witnesses,
including custody evaluator, Valerie Hale, Ph.D4, considered exhibits,
the record and argument of counsel. The Court) reserved decision on
various financial issues and drafted its own Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law which were docketed May 7^ 2008. The Court has
considered supplemental briefing on the issue of proper allocation of the
minor child's social security ("SSDI") payments and child support. These
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issues were addressed in the Court's Memorandum Decision Re: Child
Support and SSDI payments docketed May 20, 2008. As described in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law previously entered in this case,
prior to the trial petitioner moved the Court to bifurcate the trial into
two separate hearings—the first to address whether the Petition to
Modify met the standard of substantial material change in circumstances,
and the second to consider Hyrum's best interests. The Court granted
petitioner's Motion in part and denied it in part. The Court concluded
that judicial economy was best sevrved by having all of the evidence
presented during the two days set for trial, although the two issues
would be considered separately with the first part addressing whether a
showing of substantial material changes in circumstances had been met.
The second part of the trial would focus on best interests of the child
and custody issues associated therewith.

At trial the Court considered

these issues separately and in the order prescribed by law.
Based on the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and written
rulings

previously

entered

in

this

matter,

the

Court

directed

respondent's counsel to prepare an Order of Modification (the "Order").
< Petitioner lodged various Objections to the proposed Order. The guardian
ad litem has also weighed in regarding the proposed Order. The Court has
considered the respondent's proposed Order and the Objections and
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comments thereto, and now enters its own Orc^er of Modification as
follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1

The

respondent

has

established

£ufficient

change

of

circumstances to modify the Decree of Divorce entered by Judge Frank Noel
on February 28, 2005.

Specifically, the Court has found substantial,

material changes of circumstances have occurred in the custody and
parent-time arrangements of these parties since entry of the Decree,
which changes were not anticipated at the time t^he Decree was entered.
Primary among these is the unanticipated change iiji the custody order from
what was contemplated by Judge Noel's Decree after Judge Himonas'
subsequent review of that Decree. Additionally, there was significant
evidence "presented at trial that the child had not continued to enjoy
stability and success of parenting in petitionee's care as anticipated
in the Decree.

To the contrary, since the time the Decree was entered

the child's level of social, educational, and psychological functioning
has deteriorated.
2

Custody and Parent-Time. The Court considered the extensive

evidence regarding the custody and parent-time needs-of the minor child
Hyrum Doyle (dob 7/9/96), and for the reasons given in its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court concludes that respondent is the
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more appropriate parent to exercise primary custody of the child. The
Court awards to respondent Robin E. Doyle the sole care, custody and
control of this minor child subject

to reasonable parent-time for

petitioner. In reaching this conclusion the Court has expressly relied
upon and adopted the recommendations of the custody evaluator and of the
guardian ad litem.
3

The Court adopts the guardian ad litem's recommendations of

parent-time and hereby awards to petitioner Douglas Doyle alternate
weekends with Hyrum, beginning Thursdays after school and extending until
Monday morning.

On the alternate weeks when petitioner does not have

weekend parent-time, his mid-week parent-time shall extend overnight and
he shall return the child to school, or to his mother's care the
following morning if school is not in session.
4

Each parent is awarded two weeks of uninterrupted parent-time

with the minor child to be scheduled during the summer school break.
Each party must give the other thirty (3 0) days advance written notice
of the time selected.

At the time of entry of this Order, the standard

schedule of holiday parent-time ordered herein is as follows:
(a)

At the election of the non-custodial parent, parent-time
over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the time
the child's school is regularly dismissed at the
beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the
last day of the holiday weekend.
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At the election of the non-custodial parent, if school
is not in session, parent-time tover a scheduled holiday
weekend may begin at approximately 9 a.m., accommodating
the custodial parent's work schedule, the first day of
the holiday weekend until 7 p.mi. on the last day of the
holiday weekend, if the nob-custodial parent is
available to be with the child, (unless the Court directs
the application of Subsection 2|(e) (ii) (A) .
(i) A
step-parent,
grandparent,
or
other
responsible individual designated by the noncustodial parent, may pick up the child if the
custodial parent is aware of the identity of the
individual, and the parent will be with the child
by 7 p.m.
(ii) Elections should be mkde by the non-custodial
parent at the ^time of the divorce Decree or Court
Order, and may be changed by mutual agreement,
Court Order, or by the non custodial parent in the
event of a change in the cthild's schedule.
In years ending in an odd nutuber the non-custodial
parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) Child's birthday on the dky before or after the
actual birth date beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at
the discretion of the non-custodial parent, he may take
other siblings along for the ho|liday.
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr., beginning 6 p.m. on Friday
until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to Iwhich the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iii) Spring break beginning at 5 p.m. on the day school
lets out for the holiday untifL 7 p.m. on the Sunday
before school resumes;
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(iv) July 4 beginning 6 p.m.-the day before the holiday
until 11 p.m. or no later than 6 p.m. on the day
following the holiday, at the option of the parent
exercising the holiday;
(v) Labor Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at
7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier
period of time to which the non-custodial parent is
completely entitled;
(vi) The fall school break, if applicable, commonly
known as U.E.A. weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for
a lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
(vii) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday Until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and
(viii) The first portion of the Christmas school
vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b)
including Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m.
on the day halfway through the holiday, if there are an
odd number of days for the holiday period, or until 7
p.ra. if there are an even number of days for the holiday
period, so long as the entire holiday is equally
divided.
In years ending in an even number, the non-custodial
parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i) Child's birthday on actual birth date beginning at
3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for
the birthday;
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until
7 p.m. on Monday, unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
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(iii) Memorial Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until
Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to vfhich the non-custodial
parent is completely entitled;
(iv) July 24 beginning at 6 p.ml. on the day before the
holiday until 11 p.m. or no later than 6 p.m. on the day
following the holiday, at the| option of the parent
exercising the holiday;
(v) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Halloween on October 31 ojr the day Halloween is
traditionally celebrated in the local community from
after school until 9 p.m. if on|a school day, or from 4
p.m. until 9 p.m.;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m.
until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and
(viii) The second portion of the Christmas school
vacation as defined in Subjection 30-3-32(3)(b),
beginning 1 p.m. on the day halfway through the holiday,
if there are an odd number of days, for the holiday
period, or at 7 p.m. if there are an even number of days
for the holiday period, so long as the entire Christmas
holiday is equally divided.
(e)

The custodial parent is entitled to the odd year
holidays in even years and the even year holidays in odd
years.
Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive
father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday.

(g)

Mother's Day shall be spent withl the natural or adoptive
mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday.
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The Court concludes that Hyrum' s best interests will be

furthered if these parties avail themselves of the services of a parent
coordinator to facilitate resolution of issues that may arise between
them in implementing parent-time. However, the Court has chosen to defer
appointment of a parent coordinator at this time. On March 19, 2008 the
Court held a post-trial hearing at which the parties, counsel, and the
guardian ad litem were present. The guardian ad litem informed the Court
that since the time of trial, Dr. Merrill Kingston (Hyrum's therapist)
has successfully assisted the partj.es in resolving some disputes that
have

arisen.

The

Court

finds

that

so

long

as

this

therapist

is

comfortable assisting the parties in this manner, the Court will not
require the parties to secure immediately the services of a parent
coordinator.

Therefore, appointment of a parent coordinator is deferred

until such time as the present arrangement fails.

At some future time

Dr. Kingston may no longer be willing to continue his involvement in this
function.

At such time as that occurs, if at all, either party or the

guardian ad litem may bring the matter back to the Court's attention for
action.

The parties will be required promptly to confer and select an

acceptable parent coordinator. If the parties cannot reach agreement
within one week of being notified that Dr. Kingston is no longer wiling
to continue this service, the parties will then have one additional week
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within which each will submit to the Commissionetr the name and resume of
an appropriate parent coordinator.

The Commissioner will review the

submissions and recommend a parent coordinator.
the parent coordinator.

The Court will appoint

Within thirty (3 0) days of appointment, each

party shall be required to pay one-half of any retainer the parent
coordinator may require. Each party will also be responsible for paying
one-half of the cost for the services of the patent coordinator.
6

Although at the time of the trial the Court anticipated that

its determination regarding change in_ custod^ would be implemented
reasonably promptly, delays occasioned by the need to resolve objections
to the Court's decision resulted in the parties continuing their shared
custody arrangement. At the hearing held March 19, 200 8, the Court heard
argument from the parties and from the guardian ad litem.

The guardian

ad litem argued that Hyrum's best interests w^re not being served by
prolonging the period of shared custody, and utged the Court to enter
promptly an interim Order of Modification so the custodial changes could
be implemented prior to the conclusion of Hyrurfi's Easter/Spring break.
The Court was persuaded by the guardian ad litem'ls argument and that same
day entered the requested interim Order.

In issuing this Order, the

Court hereby reaffirms its earlier conclusion that entry of the interim
Order was fair, appropriate, and in Hyrum's best interests.
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Child Support and SSDI Payments .

At the divorce trial held

before Judge Frank Noel, the Court made a determination on the issue of
child support and allocation of the minor child's social security (SSDI)
payments.

Respondent Robin Doyle is totally blind and receives SSDI as

a result of her disability and there is also a dependent payment paid
separately on behalf of her minor child-

In the divorce Decree Judge

Noel gave petitioner Douglas Doyle sole legal and physical custody. But,
if respondent Robin Doyle relocated to the Salt Lake valley, the Decree
provided that the parties would have joint legal and joint physical
custody and share time equally. The Decree also provided that the social
security payments that Hyrum receives based on Robin's disability would
satisfy both
divided.
other.

parties' child support obligations and should be equally

Neither party would have a child support claim against the
After the Decree was entered, both parties filed post-trial

Motions.

The Motions were heard by Judge Deno Himonas on January 11,

2006. Judge Himonas granted petitioner's post-trial Motion, finding that
the portion of the divorce Decree that provided for an automatic change
of custody based on Robin's relocation to the Salt Lake valley was
improper.

Judge Himonas concluded that a change of custody could only

be made as part of a modification Petition.

Judge Himonas' ruling did

not address the issue of child support or SSDI credits.
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8

Based on that ruling, respondent promptly filed a Petition to

Modify.

The- Court awarded temporary sole custody to petitioner- and

continued

the fifty-fifty parent-time

sharing arrangement

that the

parties had instituted upon respondent's return tlo the Salt Lake valley.
9

By entry of an interim Order March 19, 2008, the Court changed

custody to respondent Robin Doyle, and awarded her sole legal and
physical custody of the minor child. The Court rdquested briefing on the
issue of child support and allocation of the SSDI payment.

After

considering" the briefs of the part4es and applicable law, the Court is
persuaded that the Decree of Divorce contained errors in how it allocated
Hyrum's SSDI payments, and in determining that it satisfied the parties'
respective obligations for child support. 'The Decree failed to establish
the parties' gross incomes as required by law, ajnd did not establish a
support

obligation

for

each

party

in

accordance

with

statutory

guidelines. The Court also incorrectly credited petitioner with one-half
share of Hyrum' s SSDI payments and finally, incorrectly deemed those
benefits to satisfy the support obligation of bcbth parties.

Utah law

clearly provides that when minor children are involved in a divorce case,
the

Court

must

establish

each parent's

obligation towards their minor children.

income

and

child

support

Based on review of the

Financial Declaration, the petitioner's gross monthly income is $1,.889. 60
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per month, and respondent's gross monthly income from salary and wages
is $525 per month.

Respondent also receives another $1,176 in direct

SSDI payments to her based on her disability.

Each party reported

receiving $317.50 as their one-half share of Hyrura's SSDI payment.

The

Court will use only respondent's earnings in the amount of $525 per month
as wages for child support calculation purposes.

Specifically excluded

from her gross income is her separate SSDI payment as required by Utah
Code Ann., § 78B-12-203(3) (formerly Section 78-45-7.5(3)).
10

The parties agree that the Court should use the Joint Physical

Custody Worksheet based on the parent-time orders of the Court.

The

Court finds that petitioner's time with Hyrum over the period of one
calendar year is 138 overnights, respondent has 227 overnights, and these
are the figures to be used in a Joint Physical Custody Worksheet.
Applying the child support guidelines to the joint physical custody
worksheet formula, incomes, and other findings of the Court, petitioner's
child

support

obligation

is

determined

to be

$283.94 per month.

Respondent's child support obligation is $94.82 per month. Respondent's
portion of the child support obligation must also be credited against the
SSDI amounts received on Hyrum's behalf.

Furthermore, pursuant to

Coulon v. Coulon, 915 P.2d 1069 (1996 UT App) , the SSDI amounts received
for Hyrum in excess of respondent's child support obligation are to be
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used for Hyrum's benefit and petitioner may not iclaim credit from those
"excess funds."

Rather, they are to be received by respondent and used

by her for Hyrum's benefit as she may determine &t her sole discretion.
11

The petitioner's child support obligation is thus ordered at

the level of $283.94 per month.

This obligation shall be effective as

of the date respondent assumed primary physical custody pursuant to the
Court's interim Order of Modification entered |March 19, 2008.

This

support shall be due and payable one-half by the 5th and one-half by the
20th of every month, and respondent vmay avail herself of the services of
the Office of Recovery Services to ensure receipt of these payments in
a timely manner.
12

The Court reaffirms its ruling in tjhe interim Order that

respondent is to be the payee for Hyrum's SSDI benefits.
13

Health Insurance. The parties are ord^ed to share equally in

the cost of any health insurance premiums incurred for Hyrum' s health and
dental care. Each party shall be responsible for paying one-half of any
out-of-pocket medical or dental expenses that aat*e xiot covered by such
insurance.

Reimbursement

for out-of-pocket expenses for the minor

child's health and dental care shall be made pursuant to Utah Code Ann.,
§ 78B-12-212

{formerly Utah Code Ann., § 78-45|-7.15) .

This section

includes a requirement that a parent who incurs medical or dental expense
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shall provide written verification of the cost and payment of the expense
to the other parent within thirty (3 0) days of payment, and that parent
shall be reimbursed one-half that verified amount within thirty (30) days
of receipt of payment.
14

Attorney's Fees.

The parties have filed Affidavits and

briefing concerning attorney's fees which will be addressed by the Court
in a separate ruling.
Dated this

^r^day of July, 2008.

DENISE P. LINDBERG
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true arid correct copy of the
foregoing Order of Modification, to the following, this ^ O d a y of July,
2008;

Stev$ s.

Christensen

Brennan H. Moss
Matthew B. Anderson
Attorneys for Petitioner
136 fi. South Temple, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Suzanne Marelius
Attorney for Respondent
261 Sast 300 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kim Luhn
Guardian ad Litem
331 S. Rio Grande, Suite 201
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

